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Common Law and Federalism in the
Age of the Regulatory State
Alexandra B. Klass*

ABSTRACT: Over the past several decades, the growth of federal statutes
and the rise of the regulatory state has weakened and displaced state
common law even in the absence of preemption. However, there is a strong
theoretical and judicialfoundation on which to argue that the existence of
statutes, regulations, and the data they generate should be used to inform
and develop state common law rather than overshadow or displace it.
Moreover, in this current age of the "new federalism," such progressive
common law development at the state level may be particularly timely and
appropriate. This Article uses these principles to provide a new perspective
on the evolution of environmental law from its common law beginnings in
tort law, to the flury offederal statutes and regulations, to present-day state
and local environmental-protection initiatives. This Article then argues for
increased emphasis on state common law in environmental-protection
efforts.
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COMMON LA WAND 1EDERALISM

I.

INTRODUCTION

The tension between common law and statutory law has existed in this
country for over a century. Who decides what the law is? Is it something that
is "discovered" or made? To what extent can the courts use the common law
to create more tailored legal rights and protections where the legislature has
spoken on the general issue? Exploring the relationship between common
law and statutory law shows that something has been lost in the recent
explosion of statutes and regulations. That something is an appreciation of
the power of state common law and its ability to propel progressive legal
change.
This Article first observes that along with the growth of federal statutes
and the rise of the regulatory state has come a weakening and displacement
of state common law even in the absence of express or implied preemption.
Rather than viewing this phenomenon as a natural or necessary
development as the law matures, however, this Article argues that statutes,
regulations, and the data they generate should be used to inform and
develop state common law. Moreover, in this current age of the "new
federalism," where the Supreme Court has cut back on Congress's ability to
regulate broadly in the areas of health, safety, and the environment, such
progressive common law development at the state level is particularly timely.
This Article uses the evolution of environmental law from its common
law beginnings, to the flurry of federal statutes and regulations beginning in
the early 1970s, to present-day state and local environmental-protection
initiatives, to argue for a new emphasis on state common law in
environmental-protection efforts. The thesis proposes that we should place
more emphasis on state common law and explores the extent to which state
common law courts can use federal and state statutes, regulations, and
scientific developments since the 1970s to strengthen the common law as a
means of environmental protection. This integration can bring a new
coherence to environmental law. This thesis cuts against the grain of the
majority of scholarship since the explosion of federal environmental statutes
that began thirty years ago. However, the challenges facing today's efforts to
enact and enforce federal law addressing current environmental issues such
as global warming, water pollution, and air toxins make a renewed focus on
state common law both timely and fruitful.
Part II of this Article introduces some of the key ideas underlying the
jurisprudence of the common law and its relationship to statutory law. Part
III explores how these ideas developed in the courts from the 1970s through
the present day. This Part focuses first on federal common law despite the
fact that the role for federal common law in our legal system today is much
narrower than that for state common law. Nevertheless, the most robust
discussion of the extent to which statutes can play a role in developing the
common law occurred in the context of federal common law in the 1970s
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and 1980s, precisely when Congress was in the throes of enacting farreaching environmental statutes. How federal courts grappled with
integrating these statutory developments remains instructive for developing
state common law today.
Part TV uses the evolution of environmental law during this same time
period to illustrate how state common law was often neglected during the
rise of the federal environmental-regulatory regime. This Part also discusses
the rise of the "new federalism," which has called into question Congress's
ability under the Commerce Clause to govern many environmental
concerns. Part V draws on federal and state environmental statutes,
regulations, and data to provide a new direction for state common law
development that allows it to play a more important role in environmental
protection. This Part places special emphasis on recent efforts by plaintiffs,
particularly state and local government plaintiffs, to push state common law
to address modern concerns and compensate for perceived failures by the
federal executive and legislative branches in environmental protection. This
Part concludes that it is both allowable and desirable to develop a new state
common law that incorporates data, standards, and policy principles
obtained in the statutory era to provide increased protection for human
health and the environment. Such integration will not only enhance
environmental-protection efforts but bring a new coherence to the field.
II.

THEORETICAL BEGINNINGS

Since the creation of our legal system, we have been a nation of both
statutes and common law.' How these two forms of lawmaking should
influence each other, if at all, began to receive significant treatment in the
early twentieth century among major judges and scholars, including Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, James McCauley Landis, and Benjamin
Cardozo. 2 Since then, statutes and regulations in major areas such as
criminal law, commercial law, labor relations, and corporate law have
significantly or almost completely eclipsed common law.3 Today, because of

1.

See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1, 5 (1982); WILLIAM

N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 559-60 (3d ed. 2001) (describing
various sources of lawmaking power).
2.

See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 1, at 562-67.

3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (stating
that the doctrine of negligence per se has become increasingly important in recent decades "as
the number of statutory and regulatory controls has substantially increased"); CALABRESI, supra
note 1, at I (stating that in the last fifty to eighty years, we have seen a "fundamental change in
American law" in that "we have gone from a legal system dominated by the common law.., to
one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of law"); id. at 44
("The statutorification of American Law can in one sense be dated from the New Deal.");
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) ("Between 1900 and 1950 the greater
part of the substantive law, which before 1900 had been left to the judges for decision in light of
common law principles, was recast in statutory form."); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
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the prominence of statutory law in these and many other areas, statutes and
common law often seem to be separate islands of the law. However, a rich
tradition of legal theory supports the idea that statutes should inform
common law. This tradition is discussed below, with a focus on how this
scholarship supports developing a common law informed by statutes in the
environmental-protection area.
A.

FROM COMMONLAW7"oSTATuIIoRYLAW

This Section highlights the writings of the early legal scholars and
judges who first grappled with the need to integrate developments in
statutory law and social policy into common law. While these writers often
had distinct and conflicting theoretical views and practical agendas, they all
played important roles in focusing on the development of common law
during the rise of the regulatory state.4 This theoretical foundation provides
initial support for relying on statutory and policy developments in
environmental law to expand common law.
In the early part of the twentieth century, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes argued forcefully that the law was not a neutral set of principles to
be discovered.5 Rather, the law is a product ofjudges balancing policies with
a goal of achieving a pragmatic and utilitarian solution.6 Holmes rejected
the idea that certain principles were valid in all times and circumstances, set
apart from politics and social reality. 7 Instead, the judge's role was to enforce
positive law, not existing and fixed "natural law."" In his well-known book,
The Common Law, Holmes declared that although judges rarely acknowledge
it expressly, the growth of law is primarily legislative in nature and draws
from all aspects of life and the community. 9 Consistent with this, Justice
Holmes urged judges to take a broad view of the law and consider whether
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 254 (1992) (describing efforts undertaken
in the 1950s by H.L.A. Hart and Albert M. Sacks to move academic legal thought from a preNew Deal focus on common law to emphasize instead "the major roles that statutory and
administrative law had come to play in the state").
4.
See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 169-70, 209, 217-22 (discussing disputes between
major figures in Legal Realist movement and lack of coherence within that movement).
5.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 562.
6.
Id.; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (Little, Brown & Co. 1938)
(1881) ("Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the
result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy .... ."); see also HORWITZ, supra
note 3, at 140 (describing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167-202 (1920) as the "first clear articulation of legal positivism-that is, an insistence on a

sharp distinction between law and morals-by any American legal thinker").
7. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 562 (describing Holmes's opinion about the
conflict between common law and statutes when deciding cases); HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 142
(referring to Holmes's conception of common law).
HOLMES, supra note 6, at 35-36.
9. Id. (declaring that the law draws from "all the juices of life," meaning "considerations
of what is expedient for the community concerned").

8.
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past reasons for a particular
rule were
•
10 still valid and, if necessary, revise the
law to maintain continuous growth.
Justice Holmes's ideas stood in marked contrast to the prevailing idea at
the time, expressed by William Blackstone and others, that judges do not
"make" law but simply "declare" existing, objective law that does not favor
one group or person over another." In other words, judges are simply
applying rules and principles of the natural order when they decide cases.
Under this legal theory, statutes should not be used to formulate common
law rules. 12 Statutes are political and ad hoc, while common law is based on
the discovery of pre-existing legal principles developed gradually. 3
Whether and how to incorporate legislative policies and regulatory
expertise into common law decisionmaking was debated in the Supreme
Court in the years surrounding the Court's decision in Lochner v. United
States.' 4 Lochner was one of many cases the Court decided between the late
1880s and the 1930s in which the Court used the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution to scrutinize and often invalidate state and federal
economic legislation.1 In Lochner, the Court rejected New York's claim that
its sixty-hour limit on the work week of bakery employees was reasonably
related to the promotion of employee health.16 The Court invalidated the
regulation as an interference with the contractual rights of employers and
workers.' 7 This substantive due-process approach was based in part on the
theory that these progressive legislative efforts unconstitutionally
interfered
• • 18
with contract and with natural common law principles.
By contrast, Holmes argued that judges should defer to legislative
efforts in these areas because, "[i]f law is merely a battleground over which
social interests clash, then the legislature is the appropriate institution for
weighing and measuring competing interests."' 9 Many of those Justices who
strictly scrutinized economic legislation may have justified their actions as
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
limiting

See id. at 36-37.
supra note 1, at 560-62.
Id.
Id.
Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45, 59-64 (1905) (striking down a New York statute
the working hours of bakery workers on the grounds that it violated the liberty of
ESKRIDGE ET AL.,

contract protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15.
See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1343-48 (3d ed. 2000)
(summarizing due-process caselaw).
16. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58.
17. Id. at 61-62.
18. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1358-59 (stating that economic realities of the Depression
marked the end of the "substantive due process doctrine that legislatures may not upset the
'natural' conditions of contract and property enshrined in common law categories and their
logical entailments"); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERNJUDICIAL REVIEW 154 (rev. ed.
1994) ("Legitimate acts of legislation were understood to be limited by the principles of natural
rights that were the foundation of the society.").
19. HORWITZ, supranote 3, at 142.
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nothing more than upholding common law natural rights rather than
affirmatively protecting laissez-faire economics. 20 By the mid-1930s, however,
personnel changes on the Court, public pressure, and the economic realities
of the Depression began to tip the balance in favor of Holmes's view on
legislative deference.' As a result, the 1930s marked the end of the Court's
reliance on natural law to resist legislative policy changes and the beginning
of the Court's deference to legislative efforts on economic issues. 22
These developments set the stage for Congress, state legislatures, and
administrative agencies to dominate large areas of the law formerly
controlled by common law.23 In the 1930s, these efforts focused primarily on
economic and labor issues. 24 However, with the rise of the environmental
movement in the 1970s, the groundwork Holmes and his followers laid
allowed the creation of a vast regulatory framework to address
environmental-protection issues previously left to common law.
B.

INTEGRA TING STA TUTORYLAWiNFO COMMON LAW

Legal theorists who followed Holmes did not advocate that common law
be altogether abandoned. Instead, these new legal scholars and judges
argued
that the law must use statutory developments to shape common
25
law. Indeed, much of their effort focused on the important task of how best
to expand and refine common law to incorporate the new statutory policies
and the regulatory expertise that accompanied them. 26 As stated earlier,
these scholars were not of one mind in how they viewed the role of the law
and the desired path of legal change. Nevertheless, they all, in their own
way, argued for a strong27 interrelationship between the common law and
legislative developments.
One of these scholars was Dean Roscoe Pound who, in the 1920s,
lectured on the common law's role in a time when Congress began in
earnest to delegate a significant amount of rulemaking authority to

WOLFE, supra note 18, at 153-56.
21.
TRIBE, supranote 15, at 1358-60.
22. WOLFE, supra note 18, at 160-62. For instance, Cardozo's "progressive" critique of
laissez-faire jurisprudence was that, even if such jurisprudence was lawful in the past, it was not
lawful in the present because judges must incorporate the ideas of economists and social
scientists about present conditions. Id. at 235.
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (introducing a discussion of the current
dominance of statutory law).
24. See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1358-62 (discussing legal, economic, and political changes
of the 1930s).
20.

25.

See EsKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 562-63; WOLFE, supra note 18, at 161 (discussing

legal scholars' arguments about the use of statutory developments to shape common law).
26. See HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 230-40 (discussing debates over the role of scientific
expertise and the regulatory state in development of the law).
27. See supra Part II.A (discussing the transition from common law to statutory law).
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executive agencies and boards. In a series of lectures given at Dartmouth
College in 1921, later published as The Spirit of the Common Law,29 Pound
focused on common law's key role in shaping our legal system. He argued
that despite the current trend to focus on legislative and executive
lawmaking efforts exclusively, common law must continue to play a central
role. According to Pound, common law remained necessary "to fill the gaps
in legislation, to develop the principles introduced by legislation, and to
interpret them." ° More importantly, he also warned that the role of the
courts is not merely to interpret existing legislation, but to incorporate the
results of legislation into the body of tradition.3
Pound believed common law was so well-suited to a central role in legal
development because it was unique in its ability to combine precedent and
certainty with the power to change to meet new societal needs. 32 The
common law was not just a function of precedent and stability; it should be
influenced by current social ideals to bring about progressive legal change.33
Indeed, Pound argued that common law was already integrating such
changes and had thus slowly shifted away from the "individualistic" justice of
the last century to a more socially conscious justice even before similar
changes in legislative policy became widespread.' These same principles
were present again several decades later in environmental law. As discussed
in Part IV, in the 1970s, the environmental movement was one of the "social
justice" issues changing the legal and political landscape, resulting in
common law developments as well as the creation of federal and state
statutes.35
Also in the 1920s, Justice Benjamin Cardozo emphasized the continuing
importance of common law, focusing less on the role of common law vis-a-vis
statutes and more on the duty of individual judges to consider present-day
morals and social values in shaping the law. In a series of lectures delivered
at Yale University, later published in 1921 as The Nature of the JudicialProcess,36

28. See HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 217-22 (discussing Pound's writing on the growth of the
administrative state).
29.

ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW

(Transaction Publishers 1999)

(1921).
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id. at 174-75.
32. Id. at 182.
33. Id. at 190.
34. POUND, supra note 29, at 185. But see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 1, at 563 (stating that
"[a]n implication of Pound's position . .. was that the role of courts in a democratic society
should be the elaboration and application of statutory policy, rather than the direct creation of
public policy in the common law").
35.

See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (4th ed. 2003)

(discussing the rise of the environmental movement and the "explosion" of federal
environmental legislation beginning in the 1970s).
36. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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Cardozo focused on the judge's duty to maintain a relationship among law,
morals,jurisprudence, reason, and good conscience: In doing so, the judge
should feel free to abandon rules that no longer are consistent with the
current day's sense of justice and social welfare. If the rules of law from a
prior generation are no longer appropriate or relevant, then common law
judges should abandon them in favor of growth and not wait for the
legislature to take action .
Cardozo recognized that many might argue that judges should not have
the power to change the law based on their subjective views. He responded,
however, that the judge is duty-bound by the Constitution to interpret "the
mores of today" as best he can.401 Cardozo had faith that good judges would
"do their homework" and rely on applied social sciences, expert research,
and the data being generated by the new federal agencies.4 ' Thus, Cardozo
argued judges had an obligation to integrate administrative expertise and
social development into common law.
In the 1930s, as the role of statutes and administrative agencies loomed
even larger, scholars such as Dean James McCauley Landis argued for a
greater interdependence between the growing administrative state and
common law.42 Even more than his predecessors, Landis argued that judges
could use statutes to determine social mores and that statutory principles
and agency expertise should inform common law as it develops.43
In his oft-cited article, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Landis began by
announcing that the primary difference between nineteenth- and twentiethcentury legal theories was the focus on "the judge as a creative artist" in
making the law.44 Landis argued that even though the major portion of our
law now derived from statutes, judges had refused to incorporate these

37.
Id. at 133-34; see also WOLFE, supra note 18, at 230 (stating that Cardozo's approach to
judging was that the judge should determine the direction of the law with reference to "logic,
history, custom, and sociology").
38. CARDOZO,supra note 36, at 150.
39. Id. at 151-52.
40.
Id. at 133-35; John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing
Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1335 (1990) (stating that, according to
Cardozo, "the proper function of the law is to articulate and enforce at least some of the
obligations recognized by the community"). But see WOLFE, supra note 18, at 238 (stating that
Cardozo's response in his book to potential concerns regarding abuse of judicial power was
"not very clear").
41. Goldberg, supra note 40, at 1368.
42. James M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 233
(1934) ("The consciousness that the judicial and legislative processes are closely allied both in
technique and in aims will inevitably make for greater interdependence of both.").
43.
Id. at 232-33 ("If it be true that law reflects and should reflect experience rather than
logic, legislation born of such an urge demands careful and sympathetic consideration."); see
also HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 213-16 (discussing Landis's emphasis on the benefits of agency
expertise).
44. Landis, supra note 42, at 213.
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developments in their historic approach to the law.45 Landis suggested that
the rise of both the social sciences and legislation required new methods of
46
judicial development of law beyond mere statutory interpretation. Thus, he
proposed that judges attempt to distill from a statute its basic purpose and
general statute could
use that purpose to advance the law. In this way, even
• • a47
add meaning to the law beyond its specific application.
Landis also argued that society was becoming more complex and
legislation had expanded and improved. Thus, it was no longer feasible or
desirable to confine the legislative process to mere rulemaking and the
judicial process to the mere interpretation of statutes. 4 Landis thought that
judges' then-current refusal fully to consider statutes as precedent in
deciding common law was certain to be a passing phenomenon and that
legislative
and 49 judicial processes would inevitably become more
•
This focus on incorporating legislative and agency
interdependent.
expertise into the development of the common law was likely based in large
part on his experience as a federal regulator and his strong general support
for the growth of the administrative state. "0
Starting in the 1960s, judges such as Henry J. Friendly began again to
emphasize the need for the common law to develop and expand by drawing
on the growing number of statutes and agency regulations to formulate
sound policy and address current societal needs. 5' According to Friendly and
others, in relying on legislative provisions to address situations beyond those
expressly within the purview of the statute itself, judges were not simply
interpreting statutes but developing common law. 52 This new emphasis on
common law came at a time of great social change when the country was

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 216.
48. Id. at 219-20; see also Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 14 (1936) (stating that judges should recognize the "social policy and judgment
expressed in legislation" in forming common law).
49. Landis, supra note 42, at 233 ("The present attitude responsible for our cavalier
treatment of legislation is certain to be a passing phenomenon.").
50. Landis was the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission before
returning to Harvard Law School as Dean in 1937. Much of Landis's writing from this time
focused on the benefits of administrative-agency expertise and why that expertise justified the
growth of the administrative state and its rulemaking powers. See HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 21316. See generallyJAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCESS (1938).
51.
See Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787, 791-92 (1963) [hereinafter Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking]; see
also Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 401, 402, 419
(1968). See generally HenryJ. Friendly, A Look at the FederalAdministrative Agencies, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 429 (1960) (detailing administrative agency deficiencies including delays of process,
failure to address problems before they reach a state of crisis, ad hoc determinations, and
failure to let industry and agency staff know where they stand).
52. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking, supra note 51, at 792.
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dealing with important issues of race relations, poverty, general civil unrest,
and the beginnings of the environmental movement. These judges argued
that common law can and should play a major role in addressing the social
and policy issues of the day and should not leave resolution of those issues
exclusively to legislatures and agencies.53 In other words, the continuing
proliferation of statutes and regulations should empower, not eclipse,
common law.
Twenty years later, in 1980,Judge Guido Calabresi took up the issue of
the relationship between statutes and common law in his book, A Common
Law for the Age of Statutes. In it, he called on judges to develop common law
by using their common law powers to repeal statutes that have become
obsolete. 4 In making such an apparently radical suggestion, Calabresi was
careful to point out that his proposal was not an effort to ordain judges as
the primary lawmakers. He recognized that courts are often simply unable to
act with the speed or breadth necessary for today's societal needs.55 He
emphasized, however, that courts and common law should still play a
significant role in lawmaking, not only in traditional common law areas, but
also in those areas of the law governed by statute. 56 In filling this role, courts
would be doing what they have traditionally done-providing both
continuity and change in applying legal precedent to new factual
situations. 7
Calabresi spent a significant portion of his book explaining why judges
could play such a central role in direct lawmaking despite their lack of
specialized expertise and their distance from the electorate. 58 He argued
that even though judges' relationship to the electorate was "at best
problematic[]," it could be called democratic because the requirements of
"principled" decisionmaking limited the scope of judicial authority. 9
Because of the incremental nature of common law adjudication, no single
judge could change the law broadly, and a group ofjudges could do so only
slowly and in response to changed attitudes in the public domain. 60 More
importantly, elected legislatures could always reverse judicial decisions when61
those decisions were sufficiently at odds with the will of the majority.
Calabresi concluded that courts, historically, have engaged in judicial

53.

Id.

54.

CALABRESI, supranote 1, at 7.

55.

Id. at 163.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 165.

58. See, e.g., id. at 93 ("What justifies court power to make temporary rules and thereby to
assign the burden of overcoming inertia and of getting those rules revised? . . . What justifies
courts in making law within the boundaries set by legislative inertia?").
59. CALABRESI, supranote 1, at 4.
60. Id. at 94.
61.
Id. at 4.
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lawmaking in a democracy, they have the training to perform this function,
and thus, judges could justifiably exercise authority to address legislative
62
inertia by repealing obsolete statutes.
Regardless of whether judges should have the power to repeal obsolete
statutes in the manner Calabresi proposed, legal theory expressed over time
supports the idea that common law should continue to be a strong, vibrant
force of legal change. 63 Judges should not put blinders on and look only to
judicial precedent in applying and shaping the law. Instead, judges are dutybound to consider the social, economic, and scientific data, and policy that
exists in statutory statements and agency-generated information. In the
64
absence of express or implied preemption, statutes and regulations should
help shape common law, not render it obsolete.
The legal theorists discussed above, while certainly not of one mind on
many issues, all saw common law as a vehicle for dynamic legal change that
fully encompassed statutory law, data, and public policy as it developed
through time. In other words, the growth of the regulatory state should
complement, not displace, common law. As discussed in later sections, this
dynamic use of common law has been underutilized in environmental
protection. Ultimately, despite the growth of the regulatory state in
62. Id. at 118-19.
63. Jack Davies, a law professor, Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge, and member of the
Minnesota Senate, introduced a bill in the Minnesota Legislature in 1979 entitled the
Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, which provided that twenty years after a statute is enacted or
amended, it matures into something comparable to a principle of common law that can be
limited, extended, qualified, or even overruled by courts. SeeJack Davies, A Response to Statutory
Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203, 203-04 (1979). Davies argued that
obsolete statutes represented a failure of the legal system and that the ability of the judiciary to
overrule such statutes was consistent with the legal tradition of Landis, Pound, Stone, and
Traynor and would create a "better lawmaking partnership between courts and legislatures." Id.
at 230.
64. Federal preemption, or displacement, of state statutory or common law is based on the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the Constitution and laws of the
United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,210-11 (1824) ("In every such case [where state laws are contrary
to federal law], the act of Congress or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the [S] tate, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it."). Preemption can be: (1)
express, where federal law specifically states that it preempts state law in that area; (2) implied,
where, although not expressly stated, it is clear that Congress intended to regulate completely a
particular area; and (3) resulting from actual conflict, where federal law controls if there is a
conflict between federal and state law. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
280-81 (1987) (conducting the analysis for implied preemption, but ultimately not finding it);
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204
(1983) (finding conflict preemption); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)
(finding express preemption); see also TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1172 (discussing the three
categories of preemption). Courts generally apply a presumption against displacing state law in
the absence of an express intent by Congress to preempt such law. This is due to the important
role of state sovereignty in our federal system of government. See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 117576.
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environmental law and many other areas, the United States is still a nation
founded upon common law. Our legal system is more robust and responsive
when judges use all existing tools and authority to advance common law.
Even though environmental law is a relatively new field, the standards, data,
and policy in environmental statutes and regulations should play a
significant role in the development of common law. Below is a discussion of
how judges and lawyers should begin to shape common law by integrating
the new tools of the environmental-regulatory state.
III.

JUDICIAL USE OF STATUTES IN COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT

Although the theoretical power for a vibrant common law infused with
statutes and regulatory data exists, courts do not use it on a widespread basis.
The cases in which it has been used, however, provide significant guidance
for future developments in this area.
The focus of this Article is the development of state common law.
However, this Part begins with a discussion of federal common law. Since the
Court's adoption of the "Erie Doctrine" in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,65 the
role of federal common law is quite narrow as compared with state common
law. Nevertheless, it was in the context of federal common law that the
courts first grappled expressly with the issue of how and to what extent
statutes should inform common law. These judicial efforts also occurred
during the precise time period when Congress was in the midst of creating
the field of federal environmental law. As a result, these federal common law
cases contain valuable lessons for present-day efforts to develop and
strengthen state common law based on related statutes, regulations, and the
policies behind them.
A.

THE EXAMPLE OFMORAGNE V. STATES MARINE LINES, INC.

In a 1970 admiralty case, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court expressly embraced the idea that statutes can and should
inform the development of common law. 6 In setting forth a framework for
this type of common law development, albeit in the context of the federal
common law of admiralty, the Court not only embraced the work of Pound,
Landis, and Cardozo but also provided an example that can apply to the
development of state environmental common law.
In Moragne, a widow sued for the wrongful death of her longshoreman
husband when he was killed while working on a ship in American territorial
waters. Although federal statutes governing wrongful death of seamen

65. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts, unlike
state courts, are not general common law courts and do not possess a general power to develop
and apply their own rules of decision).
66. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); see also CALABREsi, supra
note 1, at 151-52.
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existed, none of them covered this precise situation. 67 Federal and state
statutes had largely abolished the common law rule prohibiting actions for
wrongful death, but the plaintiff in Moragne had the misfortune to fall
between the cracks left by the various statutes. She was forced to rely on
federal common law, which, at that time, did not provide a remedy."'
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Harlan declared that "there is no
present public policy against allowing recovery for wrongful death."69 In
overruling a prior Court decision barring recovery for wrongful death in
admiralty cases, Harlan stated that the wide legislative rejection of the rule
"carrie[d] significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes
involved." 70 The new legislative policy "thus established has become itself a
part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of
statutory construction but also in those of decisional law."7 1 In support of
72
that proposition, Harlan cited Landis, Holmes, and Pound.
Harlan quoted and extensively paraphrased passages from Landis's
Statutes and the Source of Law. Most significantly, Harlan stated that " [i] t has
always been the duty of the common law court to perceive the impact of
major legislative innovations and interweave the new legislative policies with
the inherited body of common law principles-many of them derived from
earlier legislative enactments."73 Harlan explained that legislation
throughout the country had made claims for wrongful death the general
rule and that nothing in the statutes governing wrongful death in maritime
74
law74 expressed an intent
to foreclose recovery in the situation presented. 75
67. The Jones Act provided a cause of action for the negligent death of a seaman, and the
Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") provided a cause of action for the wrongful death of
workers on the high seas. See generally Fisheries Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-389, 96
Stat. 1949 (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988)); Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, 41
Stat. 537 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988)). The Jones Act and
its amendments arguably did not apply because the plaintiffs husband was a longshoreman, not
a seaman, and the claim the Court considered was for unseaworthiness, not negligence against
the defendant. The DOHSA also did not apply because the plaintiff's husband died in U.S.
territorial waters, not on the high seas. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376; see also Daniel A. Farber &
Phillip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature:The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law,
89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 896 (1991) (discussing Moragne and the fact that the plaintiff "had fallen
into a hole in the statutes due to the combination of the nature of the wrongful conduct and
the place of the accident"). Florida state law also did not provide a cause of action for wrongful
death under these circumstances. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376.
68. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886) (prohibiting action for wrongful
death in admiralty cases).
69. Moragne,398 U.S. at 390.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 390-91.
72. Id. at 390-92.
73. Id. at 392 (citing Landis, supranote 42, at 215-16, 220-22).
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones Act and DOHSA as the
statutes governing wrongful death in the context of maritime law).
75. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 392-402.
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Harlan thus concluded that the refusal of maritime law to provide a remedy
"appears to be jurisprudentially unsound" and the refusal should end unless
"substantial countervailing factors" require adherence to the Court's
common law precedent as a matter of stare decisis.16 In overruling the prior
case, Harlan noted that recovery for wrongful death was the expected norm
and barring such claims was "the exceptional denial of recovery that disturbs
these expectations. " 7 Thus, innovations in the federal
common law would
s
serve to strengthen, not disturb, the law's stability.7
As is obvious, Moragne is a case in admiralty. As a result of its special
status in the U.S. Constitution,7 9 admiralty law often has limited direct
application to other fields. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that Moragne did
not result in a widespread embrace of the principles of Pound, Landis, and
Cardozo in common law development in other areas.go However, Harlan's
use of statutory principles to decide a matter of common law is important.
Moragne is not direct authority for any particular matter of state common law
or even federal common law outside admiralty. Nevertheless, the case's
analysis can be embraced by any court applying or developing the common
law when there are related but not directly applicable statutes.
The growth of the doctrine of negligence per se, where violation of a
civil or criminal statute provides the standard of care in a common law
negligence action, is an obvious example of the common law's reliance on
statutes. 81 Using criminal and civil statutes to determine whether a contract
is in furtherance of an illegal purpose in a breach of contract action is
another example of the connection between the two sources of law. While
these legal developments are not attributable to Moragne, they show that
courts use statutes to develop common law in a similar manner.

76.
77.
78.
585-95,

Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 404.
Id. (quoting HENRY M. HARTJR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 485, 574-77,
606-07 (10th ed. 1958)). See generally Roscoe Pound, Some Thoughts About StareDecisis, 13

NACCA L.J. 19 (1954).

79.

The federal courts derive their exclusive jurisdiction over this field from the Judiciary

Act of 1789 and from Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The
judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . .to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction.");Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
80.
See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892, 893-97 (1982) (arguing that broad application of Moragne
and its principles "has been no more than a mirage" and citing examples of the Supreme
Court's refusal in various cases to "correct iniquities" and consider "contemporary notions of
fairness" arising after a statute's enactment).
81.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft 2005)
(stating that the doctrine of negligence per se has increased in importance in recent decades
"as the number of statutory and regulatory controls has substantially increased"); Robert F.
Williams, Statutes as a Source of Law Beyond Their Terms, 50 GFO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 571-72
(1982).
82.

See Williams, supra note 81, at 573-76.
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As stated earlier, the principles of common law development Harlan
used in Moragne can be easily applied to state or federal common law. Before
focusing on the use of these principles in developing state common law,
however, a detour into federal common law in the context of environmental
law is illuminating. The Supreme Court has never cited Moragne for the
principle that statutes should influence federal common law development. It
has, however, reviewed one lower court decision that did rely extensively on
Moragne to move federal common law forward based on principles expressed
in statutory policy in order to enhance environmental protection. In that
decision, Milwaukee v. Illinois,s 3 discussed in the next section, the Court made
clear that the limitations it was placing on the use of federal common law to
promote environmental protection did not apply to the development of state
common law. Thus, current Supreme Court precedent in this area in no way
forecloses a renewed look at the principles Harlan expressed in Moragne for
the purpose of developing a more robust state common law for
environmental-protection purposes today.
B.

REDUCING THE ROLE oFFEDERAL COMMONLAWIN MILWAUKEE V. ILLINOIS

We now turn from admiralty law to environmental law-specifically the
short-lived development of federal common law regulating the environment.
Once again, the precedent in this area is not directly applicable because the
focus of this Article is state common law. However, we address federal
environmental common law because it provides an important history of the
development of environmental law at its most crucial time. Moreover, while
the Court ultimately rejected most federal environmental common law,
there is still ample room for state common law to play a significant role in
protecting the environment.
The story of federal environmental common law begins and ends with
Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I and Milwaukee i).84 In the first case, the
State of Illinois sought leave to file an original action with the Supreme
Court against four Wisconsin cities and certain sewerage commissions for
pollution of Lake Michigan. Illinois alleged that the defendants were
discharging 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage daily
into the Lake in the Milwaukee area alone.85 Illinois sued under the federal
6
common law of nuisance and asked the Court to abate the nuisance.

83. Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
84. Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Milwaukee I, 451 U.S. 304.
85. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93.
86. Id. Federal common law nuisance is a form of "public nuisance" defined as
"unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). Conduct is deemed "unreasonable" if (1) it involves a
"significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort, or the public convenience"; or (2) "the conduct is proscribed by statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation"; or (3) "the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a
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The Court, in a 1972 opinion by Justice Douglas, refused to take
original jurisdiction of the case.87 However, in considering whether the
action could be brought in federal district court, the Court surveyed federal
law governing navigability and pollution of state waters and held first that
federal law, not state law, controlled the pollution of interstate or navigable
waters. 88 Moreover, the Court explained that statutory remedies were not the
only federal remedies available.8 9 Thus, an injunction could be granted even
though it was not "within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by
Congress."90 Douglas noted that it "is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned," and that when "we
deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a
federal common law."91
Following Milwaukee I, Illinois filed suit in Illinois federal district court,
the case proceeded to a four-month trial, and the district court entered a
judgment forcing the defendants to treat their sewage more stringently than
the obligations imposed under the federal statute and the defendants'
permits issued under that law.92 On appeal, the defendants argued that
significant amendments to the Federal Clean Water Act in 1972 and 1977
were so comprehensive as to preempt the federal common law of nuisance,
thus leaving the statute as the only federal relief available.93
In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
first noted the Supreme Court's holding in Milwaukee I that the federal
water-pollution
prior
to94the amendments, did not preempt the
federl
mon
costatute,
aw
"
federal common law of nuisance. The court then concluded that although
permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a
significant effect upon the public right." Id. § 821B(2). Thus, nuisance liability can be strict in
that legal, nonnegligent conduct can be an actionable nuisance if the interference with public
health or safety is significant. See M. STUART MADDEN & GERALD W. BOSTON, LAw OF
ENWIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS 57-58 (3d ed. 2005). A private party can sue for public
nuisance only if it can show "special damages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C. By
contrast, a private party can sue for private nuisance to obtain injunctive relief and/or
compensatory damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land so long as the invasion is either (1) "intentional and unreasonable" or
(2) unintentional but otherwise negligent, reckless, or based on conduct that is abnormally
dangerous. See id. §§ 821D, 822.
87.
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 108.
88.
Id. at 102 n.3 (rejecting the implication in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S.
493, 498 n.3 (1971), that state nuisance law was controlling).
89.
Id. at 103.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 599 F.2d 151, 155, 163 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 304
(1981).
93.
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 157 (citing Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566).
94.
Id. at 158.
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the 1972 and 1977 amendments substantially strengthened the federal
statute and created a permit system, Congress expressly included various
savings clauses in the law. As a result, Congress did not intend to preempt
either state law or the federal common law of nuisance.
The court stated, however, that the federal statute and permits were not
"irrelevant." In a section tided "Common Law of the Statute," the court
explained that a statute that does not explicitly govern a case "may contain
indications of the legislature's judgment on relevant issues of policy or
provide an appropriate principle for decision of the case." 96 In support of
that proposition, the court cited Moragne,97 Landis and other scholars, 98 and
the similar statement in Milwaukee 1.99
The court reasoned that, although the federal statute contained no
rules or principles that controlled the case, the minimum-treatment
standards and effluent limitations imposed under the law provided a
relevant starting point.'00 However, the court continued, if those limitations
were not sufficient to protect Illinois residents from harm, more stringent
requirements could be imposed under federal common law. 10 In affirming
the district court order imposing requirements beyond those contained in
the federal permits issued to the defendants, the court looked to the general
requirements "implicit" in the statute forbidding the discharge of raw
sewage into public waters. 10 Thus, expressly using the principles and theory
of Moragne, the court looked to the statute's general policy, together with
the evidence gathered at trial, to advance federal common law and impose
stricter standards than those required by the administrative bodies directly
applying the statute and issuing the permits.
This use of Moragne in the context of the federal common law of
nuisance was short-lived. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case
and reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision in 1981 (Milwaukee fl) . ° In the

95. Id. at 162-63 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1370, 1371(a)). The court also rejected the
argument that even in the absence of preemption, federal common law could not provide for
more stringent relief than that allowed under federal statute. Id. at 163-64.
96. Id. at 164.
97. Id. at 164 n.22 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390-93, 40608 (1970)).
98. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 164 n.22 (citing Landis, supra note 42, at 7, 12-19, 21-22;
William H. Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles, 1944 Wis. L. REv. 175, 186-211; Walter V.
Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 20-22 (1966); Stone, supra note 48, at 4, 1415; Traynor, supranote 51, at 401, 403-08, 412-17, 421-24).
99. Id. at 164 (citing Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972) ("While the various federal
environmental protection statutes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal
common law, they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision.")).

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 170-71.
Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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opinion, Justice Rehnquist began by stating that federal courts, unlike state
courts, "are not general common law courts and do not possess a general
Moreover,
power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.
elected representatives, not federal courts insulated from the democratic
process, should enact federal rules in areas of national concern.0 5 Thus,
although federal common law may be necessary in a few, select instances,
once Congress addresses a question previously governed by federal common
law, there is no longer a need for the federal courts to conduct their own
exercise in lawmaking. Indeed, the opinion declares that the principle of
judicial
separation of powers is too fundamental to give primacy to federal
°7
issue.'
the
addressed
already
has
Congress
where
policymaking
Rehnquist made clear that analyzing whether federal statutory law
governs a question formerly within the province of federal common law is
not the same as determining whether federal statutory law preempts state
law. In considering the latter question, principles of federalism require that
a federal statute will not preempt historic state police power absent the clear
and manifest intent of Congress.' ° Indeed, the Court noted that since the
states are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts, the
presumption against displacement of state law is consistent with a
presumption in favor of displacement of federal common law.'09
Accordingly, despite the lack of room for federal common law, the Court
was careful to leave open the possibility for states to adopt more stringent
limitations than federal law through state administrative processes or
application of their own common law of nuisance. " °
Milwaukee II was significant with regard to the development of federal
common law. First, after Milwaukee II, the federal common law of nuisance
appears to have had little role in environmental-protection efforts. Indeed,
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, a
decision released the same year as Milwaukee II, the Court extended its
decision in Milwaukee II to hold that even a defendant who is violating the
Federal Water Pollution Control Statute is immune from federal common

Id. at 312-13 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); United States
104.
v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812)).
105.
Id. at 312-13 & n.6 (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 497
(1954)).
106. Id. at 313-14; see also id. at 314 (citing to a portion of Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. 91, 107
(1972), where the Court held that federal common law would apply until the field was subject
to comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards).
107. Id. at 315.
108. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
109. Id. at 317 n.9.
110. Id. at 327-28.
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law nuisance liability.' Although several states have recently sued power
plants in the Midwest under the federal common law of nuisance to prevent
emissions of carbon dioxide that cross state lines, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York dismissed such an action in 2005. The
court held that the suit implicated so many areas of national and
international policy as to be a nonjusticiable political question consigned to
the political branches.' 12 Apart from this most recent effort, lawsuits
involving the federal common law of nuisance have been essentially
nonexistent since Milwaukee ."3
Notably, efforts to use the principles expressed in Moragne to develop
federal common law for environmental-protection purposes were short-lived
because of the Court's presumption in favor of a federal statute displacing
federal common law. By contrast, the Court preserved the presumption
against a federal statute displacing state common law. Therefore, the
decision did not foreclose and, in fact, arguably promoted the use of state
common law to address pollution issues where federal statutory and
regulatory laws fall short.
C.

CONFIRMING THE CONTINUED ROLE OFSTATE COMMON LA WIN
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. V. OUELLETTE

In 1987, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme Court
confirmed its statement in Milwaukee II that while federal common law was
no longer available to pursue environmental-protection goals where 1 a4
comprehensive federal statute exists, state common law was still available.'
In Ouellette,Vermont landowners sued the operator of a New York pulp-andpaper mill under the Vermont common law of nuisance to enjoin discharges
into Lake Champlain resulting in pollution in Vermont.1 5 The Supreme
Court first held that Vermont state nuisance law could not be used to enjoin
the pollution. The Court was concerned that holding a New York source
liable for violations of Vermont law would allow Vermont to override the
permit requirements and policy choices made by the source state." 6 This was
a problem under federal law, according to the Court, because the Act
delegated to the EPA Administrator and the source state the authority to
111. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1981).
112. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
also Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 293, 306-16
(2005) (summarizing the history of the Supreme Court's rejection of federal common law
nuisance as it applies to interstate water pollution but noting the question remains open as to
whether the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law on interstate air pollution).
113. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 67, at 891 (stating that Ouellette and Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority "complete the story of interstate nuisance law").
114. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 481-82 (1987).
115. Id. at 483-84.
116. Id. at 495.
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issue permits for discharges, and it was not for another state's common law
to override the complex, technology-based standards these delegated
authorities had considered." 7
However, the Court went on to hold that the plaintiffs still had a
remedy in the form of an action under the common law of the state in which
the polluting source was located, in this case the law of New York." 8 The
Court recognized that while the state in which a polluting source is located
should have a strong voice in regulating its own pollution, the Clean Water
Act nevertheless contemplates a role for states that share an interstate
waterway with the source." 9 The Court also found that the savings clauses in
the Clean Water Act negated displacement of all state causes of action."'
Thus, the plaintiffs could pursue their nuisance claim under New York law
based on that state's right to impose higher common law and statutory
restrictions on sources within that state.' 2 ' On remand, the district court
held that not only could the plaintiffs' water-pollution claims go forward
claims for
under New York's common law of nuisance, but their air-pollution
2
2
grounds.'
same
the
on
forward
go
could
the same discharges
Since the Ouellette decision, state common law remains a potentially
powerful tool to obtain injunctive relief and damages in actions for
interstate and intrastate pollution. Indeed, after the plaintiffs continued to
pursue their claims in the trial court under New York's nuisance law, the
defendants paid a $5 million settlement and established a trust fund for
environmental projects in the Lake Champlain area. 12 In the end, nothing
in the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence forecloses the ability ofjudges
to rely on the principles expressed in Moragne to develop state common law
in the environmental-protection area.
As discussed below, courts have not always used these principles to their
full potential, instead tending to put up a wall between statutes and common
law when it comes to resolving environmental disputes. At one time, this
perhaps could be justified by the fact that the courts needed national
statutory policy and specialized environmental agencies to obtain data, set
standards, and regulate conduct in this new and complex area of the law.
The field of environmental law is now over thirty years old, however, and
courts are now in a better position than before to use those standards to

117.

Id.
118. Id. at 497.
Ouellette,479 U.S. at 490.
119.
120. Id. at 492-93.
121. Id.
122. Ouellette v. Int'l Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D. Vt. 1987). The court noted that
"state nuisance law has always been available to private parties to resolve interstate [nuisance]
disputes.., despite the development of federal common law for [use in actions] by states." Id.
at 61.
123. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 100.
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inform common law and provide remedies and relief not available under
current statutory and regulatory law.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMON LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, AND THE
NEW FEDERALISM

The distinction Justice Rehnquist drew in Milwaukee II between the role
of federal and state common law can be placed in the broader debate over
the "new federalism" that looms large in the treatment of constitutional law
generally and environmental law specifically. The development of
environmental law prior to its statutory beginnings in the 1970s provides an
illustration of how state common law can evolve to address modem societal
problems in this era of the "new federalism." Specifically, with the muchtouted federal environmental statutes arguably at risk of losing some of their
force as a result of challenges to congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, there are good reasons to look at state common law as a player in the
game of environmental protection. The sections that follow trace the
development of environmental law from its beginnings in the common law
of tort, to its federal statutory development, and to the current challenges to
federal authority to protect environmental resources. This Part concludes
that the time is ripe to reinvigorate state common law doctrines both to
bolster federal environmental-protection efforts and to provide a safety net

in the event future constitutional limits are placed on federal authority.
A.

RISE AND FALL: ENVIRONMENTAL COMMON LA WAND THE
GROWTH OFTHE REGULA TORY STATE

In the beginning, the story goes, environmental law was little more than
tort law with an emphasis on nuisance law. 124 Attempts to enjoin or recover
damages for pollution, noise, dust, and odor were brought as claims under
the common law of nuisance, negligence, trespass, or strict liability. 12 5 As the
nation became more industrialized, these disputes became more frequent

124. See, e.g., id. at 60 ("Prior to the explosion of environmental legislation in the 1970s, the
common law was the legal system's primary vehicle for responding to environmental
disputes."); WILLIAM H. RODGERSJR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 112 (2d ed. 1994) ("To a

surprising degree, the legal history of the environment has been written by nuisance law. There
is no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a
regulator of land use and of technological abuse."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Greeningof America
and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three
Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 76 (2001) (stating that "prior to 1970,
environmental protection law in the United States was essentially nonexistent" except for a few
isolated state efforts and common law property and tort doctrines).
125. MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 86, at 4-5 (stating that environmental tort actions are
frequently pleaded with multiple theories of recovery, namely negligence, strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities, trespass, and nuisance); RODGERS, supra note 124, § 2.1, at 112
("The impact of technology on humans has contributed in no small way to doctrinal
developments in nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities.").
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and more complicated. Still, it was not until the 1970s that Congress made
any significant effort to build on existing common law tort remedies and
provide a federal statutory system for regulating conduct that affects the
environment. 6 Significantly, it is a myth that there was no affirmative
regulation of the environment prior to the beginning of federal
congressional involvement in the 1970s. 2 7 States and cities began regulating
air and water pollution as early as the late 1880s, and, by the 1970s, eightyfour cities, eighty-one counties, and all fifty states had some form of airpollution regulation, some of which were quite successful."" Moreover,
states relied heavily on the judicial system to deal with interstate pollution
problems even prior to the Milwaukee v. Illinois litigation in the 1970s.
Indeed, state and federal courts played a significant role in creatively
using tort law to deal with the increasingly complex problems of an
industrialized society. Some courts in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries used the doctrines of nuisance, trespass, and strict
liability to enjoin profitable industrial activities in order to protect the
environment and the rights of farmers and residents to be free from
pollution. 1 9 For instance, the Maryland Supreme Court in 1890 enjoined a
fertilizer factory from emitting noxious vapors that were damaging the
health and property of a nearby family."O Likewise, the New York Court of
Appeals in 1913 enjoined a paper mill's operations from polluting a stream

126. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 35, at 88 (describing the time period from 1970 to 1980
as containing an "explosion of federal legislation" and creating an era of "federal regulatory
infrastructure"); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalizationof
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 317-18 (1985) (describing the "extraordinary
outburst" of pollution legislation "at the national level during the 1960s and 1970s" that
"developed fairly suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere").
127. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 578-79 (2001) ("[T]he view widely held in the legal literature that the
states ignored environmental problems before 1970 is simply not correct."); id at 579 (listing
numerous states, cities, and counties with regulatory programs to control air pollution and
citing statistics showing that the concentrations of important air pollutants were falling at
significant rates).
128. Id. at 579-80 (citing statistics showing a more rapid decline of air-pollutant
concentrations during state regulatory efforts than after the beginning of extensive federal
regulation of air pollution). But see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 86 ("State laws and local
ordinances to protect public health and to require the abatement or segregation of public
nuisances were common, although they were poorly coordinated and rarely enforced in the
absence of a professional civil service.").
129. See, e.g., MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 86, at 240-42 (discussing early cases granting
injunctions against polluting activities).
130. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 902 (Md. 1890) (upholding a verdict
for the plaintiff under nuisance theory and stating that "[n]o one has a right to erect works
which are a nuisance to a neighboring owner, and then say he has expended large stims of
money in the erection of his works, while the neighboring property is comparatively of little
value").
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used by farmers despite the economic benefits of the mill.1 3 1 In 1904, a

federal court in Utah enjoined a mine and smelter injuring nearby crops
and animals. 3 2 Several decades later in the 1950s, the Oregon Supreme
Court awarded $91,500 in damages for lost cattle and soil contamination as a
result of fluoride emissions from a nearby aluminum plant.1 33 Similarly, the
North Carolina Supreme Court enjoined an oil refinery emitting gases and
odors that interfered with a neighbor's property.134 This equitable power is
also reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1907 decision in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 135 where the Court used

the doctrine of federal

common law nuisance to enjoin a Tennessee mining company's noxious air
emissions that were crossing state lines and affecting the State of Georgia's
air, forests, crops, and orchards. Other courts, however, refused to enjoin
economic activity to protect the environment and used their powers in
36
equity to allow the polluting conduct to proceed in the name of progress.1
Despite these different results, at the dawn of the age of federal
environmental regulation in the 1970s, there was ample precedent for state
and federal common law to remain a force in the growing effort to address
modern-day pollution.' 7
Nevertheless, the environmental-law story generally claims that there
has been little need for common law after 1970 as a result of the powerful
environmental regulatory state that is better suited to deal with today's
131. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) (enjoining plant's
operations with an investment of $1 million in favor of plaintiffs' farms; noting the "destructive"
nature of the waste from the mill to vegetable life, animal life, and water; and stating that
"[a]lthough the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the defendant's
expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason for refusing the injunction").
132. McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952-53 (D. Utah 1904)
(refusing to balance the value of the smelter and the value of the farms, and focusing on the
individual rights of the farmers to be free from pollution).
133. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959) (stating that intrusion of
particles constituted a trespass).
134. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682,690 (N.C. 1953).
135. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
136. See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484-85 (1873) (refusing to adopt the
doctrine of strict liability for tort actions in the name of economic progress); Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (Tenn. 1904) (recognizing that
the defendant's mining operation, which was the same facility involved in the Georgia v.
Tennessee Capper decision cited supra note 135, was a nuisance to nearby residents who suffered
from crop damage, timber damage, and ill health, but refusing to enjoin the activity for lack of
better technology and because of its economic value). "We must have factories, machinery,
dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at
the basis of all our civilization." Losee, 51 N.Y. at 484.
137. See, e.g., Roger E. Meiners et al., BurningRivers, Common Law, and Institutional Choice for
Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS
FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 54, 71 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000)

("Common law environmentalism evolved across the states, provided a means for ordinary
people to protect themselves from environmental harms, and became a key institutional player
in the 'marketplace' for environmental rights.").
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complex environmental issues." 8 While it is generally recognized that state
regulatory efforts continue to play a major role in environmental protection
(where state agencies can develop expertise), the same recognition often
does not extend to state common law-beyond, perhaps, the ability
to collect
39
damages where federal law does not provide for such a remedy.
The courts based this heavy focus on federal regulatory law in part on

the premise that the federal government was in a better position to grapple
with national environmental problems such as air pollution, water pollution,
and soil and groundwater contamination because of better funding,
resources,
expertise,
and
data-collection
capabilities. 140
Moreover,
environmental statutes and regulations could provide broad, prospective
solutions to environmental problems while common law was limited to
deciding individual cases on a retrospective basis.' 4 ' The idea that the
federal government was in a better position in the 1970s to develop
technical expertise, provide funding, and implement more uniform
solutions to environmental problems is certainly true. The purpose of this
Article is not to argue that federal environmental statutes should never have
been enacted or that common law on its own is a preferable solution today
to new statutory or regulatory initiatives and strong enforcement of existing

138.
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 777 (5th ed. 2002) ("That the
law of nuisance has a place in environmental control seems clear, but there are a number of
reasons to conclude that its contributions must be limited ones.... The general conclusion...
is that nuisance litigation is ill-suited to other than small-scale, incidental, localized,
scientifically uncomplicated pollution problems."); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 72
("[T]here is wide agreement that private nuisance actions alone are grossly inadequate for
resolving the more typical pollution problems faced by modern industrialized societies."); J.B.
Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of "The Fragile Land System," 20 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Fall 2005, at 3 (rejecting standard history of environmental law and concluding that
legislative initiatives should look to common law for guidance, particularly for purposes of
ecosystem management and ecosystem services).
139. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 101 (noting that common law remains
important for compensation purposes but that "[s]ome of the most innovative environmental
protection measures are the product of state regulations").
140. See Milwaukee I, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) (stating that complex problems of water
pollution are inappropriate for federal common law and more appropriate for federal
"administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise"); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at
66-67 (discussing plaintiffs' inability to prove causation as a limiting factor in using the
common law to obtain relief for environmental harm); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 283 (3d ed. 2004) (citing various
limitations of the common law in addressing environmental problems); Revesz, supra note 127,
at 578 ("[T]he federal government is better suited than states to provide scientific information
about the adverse health and environmental effects of various pollutants, because of the
economies of scale in developing such information.").
141.
See, e.g., PLATER ET AL., supra note 140, at 283 (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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environmental statutes. 142 Instead, the issue this Article explores is how state
common law can be revived to fill its historic role as a gap-filler to address
environmental-protection needs based in part on the policies in and data
generated by environmental statutes and regulations. Indeed, the broad
savings clauses in most federal statutes have left ample room for143 state
common law to be a major player in environmental-protection efforts.
The fact that common law has been seen as a sideline since the 1970s
may be a function of two key judicial decisions that grappled with the
continuing role for judge-made common law in the face of a growing body
of statutory law. The first was the Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee
11,144 which removed the federal common law of nuisance as a tool to address
interstate water-pollution issues. Although the Court's later decision in
InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette145 made clear that state common law was
still available to address both intrastate and interstate air- and waterpollution issues, the shadow of Milwaukee II may have discouraged litigants

142. See, e.g., id. (stating that "many modern environmental problems are so complex and
difficult to prove in the courtroom setting that common law cannot be relied upon to serve as
society's primary environmental law strategy").
143. See, e.g.,
Clean Water Act § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2000) (including a savings
clause); Clean Air Act § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (including a savings clause);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §
302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (including a savings clause); see also Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481, 497-500 (1987) (holding that the Federal Clean Water Act does not preempt state
common law nuisance claims); Akzo Coatings v. Am. Renovating, 842 F. Supp. 267, 273 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (stating that CERCLA does not preempt state law remedies such as nuisance to
recover property damage associated with hazardous-substance contamination); Terra-Products
v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 653 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that although evidence
did not support recovery on the facts of the case, CERCLA's broad savings clause means that a
defendant responsible for contaminating a plaintiff's property can be liable for diminution-ofproperty damages under state common law tort theories even after conducting remediation of
plaintiff's property under CERCLA); Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. CAE-Link Corp., 622
A.2d 745, 753-56 (Md. 1993) (explaining that emergency federal orders issued under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and state law did not preempt the plaintiff's claims for
nuisance and strict liability stemming from odors emanating from sewage sludge plant); Sharp
v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 810 P.2d 1270, 1273-75 (Okla. 1991) (holding that state regulatory
approval of a landfill does not preempt a common law nuisance claim to enjoin operation of
the landfill based in part on savings clause of state pollution-control statute); Bradley v. Am.
Smelting & Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782, 792-93 (Wash. 1995) (holding that Washington statute
controlling air emissions does not preempt action in nuisance to recover damages in part based
on savings clause of state statute); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 101 ("Even though the
federal environmental laws often require states to meet minimum national standards, they
generally do not preempt state law except in narrowly defined circumstances."); Roger Meiners
& Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 923, 952 (1999) ("In general, the various federal statutes did not eliminate the right to
bring common law actions; they created an alternative that is, in general, much easier to bring
(and win).").
144. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 331-32.
145. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 499-500.
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from using common law at all in favor of the possibilities provided by new
federal statutes.
The second decision that may have influenced the marginalization of
state common law despite the holding in Ouellette is the New York Court of
Appeals' 1970 decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 146 In that case, the

plaintiff homeowners sued the defendant cement plant under the state's
common law of nuisance alleging that the plant's emission of dirt, smoke,
and soot, as well as vibrations emanating from the plant, interfered with the
use and enjoyment of their properties. 4 7 Thus, this was a wholly intrastate
dispute that state common law governed.
In resolving the case, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that
the plant's activities constituted a nuisance but refused to enjoin the plant's
operations. In justifying its decision, the court focused on the inability of a
common law court to address complex federal air-pollution problems that
extended beyond the confines of the case before it. The court noted at the
beginning of the opinion the public concern over air pollution and the
14
growing responsibility of the state and federal governments to address it.
The court then questioned whether it was appropriate for private litigants
seeking relief from a specific plant to turn their case into one that required
resolution of "broad public objectives." 4 9 It noted that legislative and
regulatory authorities were far from coming up with an adequate solution to
the problem, and that necessary technical measures
had not been developed
50
and might not even be economically practical.1
The court further distanced itself from being a part of any solution by
stating that controlling air pollution will depend on significant technical
resources, on a balance between the economic impact of regulation and
public health, and will likely require significant public expenditure beyond
that of any local community. ' The court then held that damages would
compensate the plaintiffs and be adequate to encourage the defendant
to
152
conduct research to improve its technology and minimize the nuisance.
The significance of the New York court's decision is less a function of its
holding (the plaintiffs at least received compensatory damages) than of its
146. Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
147. Id. at 871. In contrast to the Milwaukee cases, the plaintiffs' claim in Boomer was under
principles of private nuisance, not public nuisance. For a discussion of the standards for public
nuisance and private nuisance and the difference between the two, see generally Robert
Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private
Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359 (1990) (arguing that Boomer may have

added to the lack of understanding of the law of public nuisance because it failed to distinguish
between the two causes of action); supra note 86.
148. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
149.
Id.
150. Id.
151.
Id.
152. Id. at 873.
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analysis. In rejecting the request for an injunction, the court minimized the
potential role it could play in both spurring innovation and addressing the
immediate impact of pollution on state residents. This was not a case where
the court needed to be concerned with enjoining the operations of an outof-state plant. 53 Instead, the plaintiffs simply asked the court to balance the
equities between two sets of in-state interests and reach a result that the
empowered to reach under its equitable authority and state
court was clearly
154
common law.

Indeed, a strong dissent in Boomer made precisely this argument. In his
dissent, Judge Jasen recognized that the significant national and state
problem of air pollution and the state and federal statutes expressing a
policy to prevent air pollution were precisely the reasons why an injunction
was appropriate in the case. 55 In concluding that the health and
environmental problems that the plant was causing warranted an injunction,
Jasen stated that his intent was not to close the plant but to recognize the
urgency of the problem and allow the company a certain period of time to
develop a solution. 56 Finally, he warned that "[i]n a day when there is
growing concern for clean air, highly developed industry should not expect
acquiescence by the courts, but should, instead, plan its operations to
eliminate contamination of our air and damage to its neighbors.", 57 Thus,
Jasen correctly viewed the common law as fully capable of working in
tandem with legislative efforts to control pollution.
Also in the 1970s, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
expressed a vision similar to one expressed by the dissent in Boomer
regarding the role of state common law in this new era of environmental
awareness. In Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co.,15s a case decided just a

few years before Milwaukee II, the court considered an action to enjoin an
auto-shredder company's operations on state nuisance grounds. Although
the court found the lower court's injunction closing the facility in error, its
language on the role of state common law showed a recognition of both the
power and necessity for continued judicial involvement in environmentalprotection efforts. The court stated that the case was part of a "new breed"
153. Even if it had, InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), later confirmed
that this could be accomplished using the source state's common law. See supra notes 118-21

and accompanying text.
154. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 67, at 890 n.59 (noting that the court in Boomer
retreated from "the traditional policymaking role of the courts" and that, in fashioning an
appropriate equitable remedy, courts historically have considered the broad public interest in

addition to the private interests of the parties to the suit (citing DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 65 (1973); Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 531, 565 (1988))).
155. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875 (Jasen,J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 877.
157. Id.
158. Harrison v. Ind. Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1976).
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of lawsuit created by the "growing concern for cleaner air and water." 5 9 The
court recognized that the growth of environmental litigation has forced the
courts into "difficult situations where modern hybrids of the traditional
concepts of nuisance law and equity must be fashioned." 1' 6 Despite these
difficulties, the court declared that "environmental consciousness may be
the saving prescript for our age," and that the right of injured parties to
obtain relief in the courts "serves as a necessary and valuable supplement to
legislative efforts to restore the natural ecology of our cities and
countryside.''
The court noted the difficulties of judicial involvement in
"environmental balancing" but concluded that there must be a forum for
aggrieved parties and the courts are "qualified to perform the task." 162 The
court also explained that, unlike legislatures, courts are skilled at balancing
equities, are insulated from lobbying from industrial polluters, and often are
a
in a better position to judge the effect of a pollution nuisance upon
63
problem.
individual
the
to
proximity
physical
their
of
because
locality
This physical proximity is particularly important in nuisance cases,
where the court must determine whether the defendant's invasion of the
plaintiff's interest is "unreasonable" based on weighing the gravity of the
harm against the utility of the defendant's action.'" The court assesses the
"gravity of the harm" based on the extent, character, social value, and local
suitability of the plaintiffs land use. 165 In turn, the court assesses the "utility"
of the defendant's conduct based on the social value of the defendant's
conduct, whether it is suitable to the character of the locality, and the
impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion. 66 As a result, the
Seventh Circuit's observation that judges are in a good position to conduct
this type of localized, fact-intensive balancing makes sense.
These two competing visions of the role of state common law (the
Boomer majority on the one hand and the Boomer dissent and Harrisonon the

159.

Id. at 1120.

160.

Id.

161.

Id.

162.

Id.

163.
Harrison,528 F.2d at 1120. One might argue, however, that judges are less free today
from political pressures because of recent judicial decisions allowing judges to obtain party
endorsements and take positions on political issues when running for judicial office. See, e.g.,
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding a state canon ofjudicial
conduct that prohibited candidates for judicial election from expressing views on disputed legal
or political issues violated the First Amendment); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d
738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding on remand that a state canon of judicial conduct that
prohibited candidates for judicial election from soliciting contributions and attending political
gatherings violated the First Amendment).
164.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 826 (1979).

165.
166.

Id.§ 827.
Id. § 828.
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other) at the beginning of the modern environmental era show courts
struggling with their policymaking role during a critical time in the
development of statutory environmental law. The Boomer and Harrisoncourts
issued their decisions in the 1970s, just at the dawn of the explosion of
environmental statutes and the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). In fact, President Nixon signed the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 only a few months after the Boomer decision.1 67 In the
next decade, Congress enacted significant new laws addressing water
pollution, pesticides, solid and hazardous waste, hazardous-substance
contamination, and control of toxic substances. 68 Notably, Boomer marked
the beginning of a major decline in the use of state common law to achieve
major pollution-prevention goals, which lasted from 1970 until very
recently. 69 Indeed, a 1998 study of reported pollution-related cases from
1945 through 1994 found that the number of common law actions to
address environmental harm declined markedly beginning in 1975, and
those cases that did address state common law
claims were more often
70
decided in federal court rather than state court.
Boomer came not only at a significant point in the development of
statutory law, but also at what could have been a significant point in the
development of common law. Just three months after Boomer, in June 1970,
the Supreme Court issued its admiralty law decision in Moragne, discussed
earlier in Part III.A.171 Moragne presented a very different vision than Boomer
of the role of common law in areas where statutes govern some, but not all,
of the legal landscape. In essence, Moragne stood for the idea, expressed by
the dissent in Boomer, that broad statutory policy should be used to develop
common law in order to remedy environmental harms presented to the
courts. Thus, in the scope of one year, two decisions, one state and one
federal, offered opposite prescriptions for how courts should use their
common law power when faced with the shadow of statutes.

167.

MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 86, at 253.

168.

See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 88-90 (providing a chronology of significant

federal environmental legislation).
169. MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 86, at 253 (stating that in the thirty years since Boomer
was decided, very few cases have addressed the issue of solving major pollution problems
through injunctions and damages, and attributing that lack of cases to the overhaul of the
Clean Air Act in 1970 and a comprehensive rulemaking structure); see also Meiners & Yandle,
supra note 143, at 944 ("Since regulations have come to dominate air pollution law, few
common law cases have been litigated in recent years."). For recent efforts to use the common
law for major pollution-prevention efforts, see infra Part V.B.
170. H. Marlow Green, Can the Common Law Survive in the Modern Statutory Environment?, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 109 (1998). As a result of this trend, state courts are unable to

develop their own common law. Instead, traditional state common law claims such as nuisance
and trespass are add-ons to claims brought in federal court pursuant to the various federal
environmental statutes and likely receive less attention than they would in state court. Id. at 108.
171.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); see supra Part III.A.
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Although Boomer is a state case, its influence extended far beyond New
York state boundaries, quickly becoming an "established part of the legal
canon," subject to significant scholarly treatment and inclusion in most
172
Property, Torts, Environmental Law, and Remedies textbooks. According
to environmental- and constitutional-law scholar Daniel Farber, Boomer's
fame and continued use as a teaching tool is due to its appealing "drama,"
its apparent factual simplicity, its effort to achieve pragmatic fairness, and its
timing; decided at the beginning of both the environmental movement and
the law-and-economics movement, it became a paradigm case for both
fields. 7 3 It is quite possible that, because the case is so well known, it
influenced not only other courts (including courts outside New York), but
also lawyers and litigants deciding whether or not to spend significant
resources to pursue similar claims.' 7 4 To the extent that this influence
existed, the Boomer court's decision to stand aside to let Congress and state
legislatures grapple alone with major policy issues sent a strong message that
of state common law in the growing field of
minimized the role
17
environmental law. 5
However, as Farber has stated, we effectively came "full circle" during
those years from Milwaukee I ("preempting state law in favor of the federal
common law"), Milwaukee II ("preempt[ing the] federal common law"), and

172.

See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in

7 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988); Daniel
A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 113 (2005)
[hereinafter Farber, The Stoiy of Boomer] ("[Boomer] has become an established part of the legal
canon. It looms large, not just in environmental law, but also in property, remedies, and
PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION

torts."); Comment, InternalizingExternalities: Nuisance Law and Economic Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 219, 226-29 (1978); see also Abrams & Washington, supra note 147, at 399.
173. Farber, The Story ofBoomer, supra note 172, at 148.
174. While there may be no direct data showing a cause-and-effect relationship between the
Boomer decision and the decline of nuisance lawsuits, the existence and notoriety of the case
may be at least one factor resulting in the decline in the number of common law claims in state
courts to address environmental concerns. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
175.

See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note

138, at 777 (detailing the shortcomings of

nuisance suits and stating that judges show a reluctance to use nuisance "as the means for an
ambitious program of environmental control"); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 88-90
(providing a chronology of significant federal environmental legislation including the National
Environmental Policy Act and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970; the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act) in 1972 and its significant amendments in 1977 and 1987; the
Endangered Species Act in 1973; the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974; the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976; the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980; and the Emergency
Planning and Right-to-Know Act of 1986); Meiners & Yandle, supra note 143, at 944 (noting that
" [s]ince regulations have come to dominate air pollution laws, few common law cases have been
litigated in recent years"); Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons for Environmental Law from the American
Codification Debate, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY

BAsIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 137, at 130, 151-52 ("Environmental law
today is primarily an exercise in statutory and regulatory interpretation, and the common law
has been already largely crowded out of environmental law.").
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Ouellette ("reinstat[ing] state law").' 76 As a result, Ouellette lays the
groundwork for a different vision than that expressed in Boomer and provides
a strong basis for states and their citizens to use their common law, in
addition to statutory and regulatory efforts, to increase environmental
protection.
Moreover, in the years since these cases were decided in the 1970s and
1980s, the legal landscape has changed significantly in favor of state
common law.' 77 First, as discussed in the next section, the "new federalism"
movement has called into question the ability of the federal government to
control environmental pollution through broad statutory mandates. Second,
the vast amounts of data, technology, and expertise available in the market
as a result of federal statutory and regulatory development provide tools for
courts to shape the common law while minimizing the competency concerns
expressed by the court in Boomer. These issues are discussed below.
B.

THE NEW FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The U.S. Constitution is based on a compromise between those
founders who supported a strong national government and those who
wished to preserve individual state autonomy.' Thus, the structure of the
Constitution creates a system of "dual sovereignty" giving power to both the
federal government and the states.179 While this system of federalism has
always been fundamental to our governmental structure, it has taken on
increasing significance since the 1990s as the Rehnquist Court used
principles of federalism to cut back on federal congressional authority in
favor of state autonomy. As explained below, this narrowing of federal
statutory authority may put at risk many of the broad federal environmental
statutes upon which we have come to rely. This potential narrowing of
federal legislative authority provides the opportunity for litigants and lawyers
to lay the groundwork for courts to develop state common law to address
current environmental issues based on the policies and standards in existing
federal and state environmental statutes.

176.

Farber, The Story of Boomer, supra note 172, at 146.

177.
One caveat to this trend, of course, is the Bush administration's recent, aggressive
push for more federal preemption of common law tort claims against the pesticide and
pharmaceutical industries, among others. See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
178.
See, e.g., ALICE M. RJVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 82-83 (1992) (describing the development of American
federalism); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF

NATIONAL POWER 14-54 (1992) (tracing the establishment of the federal system and
Constitution); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism":
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97, 114-16 (1996) (same).
179.

Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501

U.S.

452, 457 (1991).
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One of the broadest of Congress's enumerated powers in the U.S.
Constitution is the power to regulate interstate commerce.18 0 Under this
authority, from the time of the New Deal until the 1990s, the Supreme Court
approved far-reaching federal legislation governing housing, labor, racial
discrimination, and the environment, based on the principle that seemingly
local activities had a "substantial effect" or "cumulative effect" on interstate
commerce. 181
It was not until the 1990s that the Court began an effort to rein in
Congress's power in a series of cases that had a significant impact on the
balance of power between the federal and state governments. In 1995, in
United States v. Lopez,'8 2 and in 2000, in United States v. Morrison,'83 the Court
struck down for the first time in nearly sixty years two federal statutes as
beyond Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. Lopez involved a
federal statute imposing criminal sanctions for possessing guns within a
certain distance from schools, and Morrison involved a federal statute
imposing criminal sanctions for domestic violence. In these cases, the Court
held that the laws in question regulated
wholly intrastate activity and thus
84
did not regulate interstate commerce.1
The Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison have led to a host of
challenges to many of the environmental statutes Congress enacted under its
Commerce Clause authority in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Clean Air

180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (providing that Congress shall have the power to
regulate commerce "among the several states"); TRIBE, supra note 15, at 807-08 (stating that
"[t]he Commerce Clause is... the chief source of congressional regulatory power").
181.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (noting that cases decided in the
1930s and 1940s "ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded
the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause"); TRIBE, supra note 15, at 81115 (citing the development of expanded authority for Congress under the Commerce Clause as
a result of Supreme Court decisions in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43
(1937) (holding that Congress can regulate labor relationships at an integrated manufacturing
plant because of the effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-15
(1941) (upholding the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act even where
the activity took place wholly intrastate because of the impact on other states); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that Congress can control farmers' wheat
production for home consumption because supply and demand cumulatively impact price and
markets); and Katzenbachv. McClung,379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964) (upholding enforcement of a
federal law prohibiting racial discrimination against a small restaurant on grounds that the
combined effect of all segregated restaurants inhibits the sale of goods and obstructs travel));
Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialFederalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 377, 390 (2005) ("For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that
there were justiciable limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power was a dead
letter."); Steinzor, supra note 178, at 116-17 (describing the proliferation of federal power and
programs from the time of the Great Depression and the New Deal).
182. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
183. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
184. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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Act,185 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 86 the Endangered Species Act,187 and the Clean
Water Act.1 88 While the federal appellate courts have generally rejected these
challenges, many of the decisions have been subject to strong dissents.8I 9
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has avoided constitutional review of
these decisions, the Court will likely address the constitutionality of one or
more of these federal laws in the near future as challenges continue.
The Court has come close to addressing these issues in two recent Clean
Water Act cases. In Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers
("SWANCC'),190 the Court was called upon in 2001 to determine whether the
Army Corps could assert federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over
intrastate, isolated wetlands solely on the grounds that the wetlands
provided a habitat for migratory birds. 9' The Court invalidated the Army
Corps regulation at issue on grounds that the statute itself did not provide
forjurisdiction over such wetlands, and thus did not reach the constitutional
issue. 192 However, the Court stated that if the statute was interpreted to allow
for such jurisdiction, the interpretation might raise "serious constitutional
problems."' 93

185.

42 U.S.C. §§

74

01- 7 67 lq (2000).

186. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
187. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
188. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
189. See, e.g.,
Allied Local & Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 81-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the Clean Air Act limiting the
content of VOCs in architectural coatings); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511
(lth Cir. 1997) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of CERCLA to
local waste-disposal activity); Frier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 203 (2d Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of CERCLA limitations period to
state law claims involving damages resulting from the release of hazardous substances); Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting a Commerce
Clause challenge to the application of the Endangered Species Act to a fly found only in a
portion of California); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 486-87 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a
Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the Endangered Species Act to the taking of
red wolves on private property); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir.
2003) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the Endangered Species
Act to a Texas cave spider); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the Endangered Species
Act to the arroyo toad); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a
Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the Clean Water Act to wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters); see also Adler, supra note 181, at 404-06 (discussing the current wave of
Commerce Clause challenges to federal environmental statutes).
190. Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
191. Id. at 162.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 173. But see id. at 192-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Army Corps'
power over wetlands that serve as a habitat for migratory birds is well within Commerce Clause
boundaries and Congress intended to extend jurisdiction to those boundaries in the Clean
Water Act).
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More recently, in Rapanos v. United States,194 the Court in 2006 addressed
whether the term "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act included
wetlands lying near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into
traditional navigable waters. 195 Like in SWANCC, Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion in Rapanos interpreted the Clean Water Act in a manner that did
not decide the constitutional issue, but again warned that a broader reading
waters" would "stretch the limits of Congress's commerce
of "navigable
19 6
"

power.

The Court's current willingness to scrutinize federal regulation of
seemingly local activities-as shown in the Lopez and Morrison cases discussed
earlier-poses more than a minimal threat to federal authority over
environmental resources such as intrastate wetlands, endangered species
that do not regularly cross state lines, and individual parcels of land that are
subject to soil or groundwater contamination.19 7 While it is too soon to know
just how far the Court will go in reining in federal authority to regulate
natural resources and pollution on Commerce Clause or other grounds in
future cases, the current trends and warning signs argue for a renewed
emphasis on state 19law to address pollution and natural-resources concerns in
the coming years.

8

V. REDISCOVERING STATE COMMON LAW WITH THE HELP OF FEDERALISM,
STATUTORY STANDARDS, AND REGULATORY DATA

Today, there is significant public concern over the failure of the federal
executive and legislative branches to address modern environmental
concerns such as global warming, air pollution, water pollution, and

194. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
at 2219.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2212. But see id. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing an alternate
interpretation of "navigable waters" and stating that such an interpretation is consistent with
the Commerce Clause); id. at 2261-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating there is no constitutional
reason why Congress cannot extend jurisdiction to adjacent wetlands that play an important
role within the watershed).
197. But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6-9 (2005) (holding that application of a federal
drug law criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana in California
did not violate the Commerce Clause despite valid California law allowing such activities for
medicinal purposes); Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Gonzales v. Raich, the
"ComprehensiveScheme" Principle, and the Constitutionalityof the Endangered Species Act, 35 EN vTrL. L.
491, 497 (2005) (stating that the Court's decision in Raich signals that the federalism
"revolution" is not as radical as feared and that Raich should put an end to judicial attacks on
the Endangered Species Act).
198. This judicial trend toward devolving power from the federal government to state
governments contrasts with recent federal efforts by the executive branch and certain members
of Congress to use federal law to preempt efforts by injured parties to recover damages
associated with pesticides, prescription drugs, and other products under state tort law. See infra
notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
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regulation of toxic substances.'9 9 In response, many state and local
governments have taken matters into their own hands to attempt to fill this
perceived regulatory and enforcement void.2 00 The lack of federal action and
the rise of more aggressive state action, coupled with the new federalism,
present the perfect opportunity to consider the potential role of state
common law in new environmental-protection efforts. Although we may
have missed the opportunity to examine common law options in the rush to
fix all our environmental problems through federal statutes and regulations,
"there is no reason why the periodic and seemingly endless attempts to
redesign those statutes should not include consideration of common law
alternatives as well." 20 1 Efforts to make renewed use of state common law
augmented by statutory policy and data created over the past thirty years can
be justified not only to increase environmental protection, but also to
provide a closer connection and more consistency between statutory and
common law in a field that has always been a function of both statutes and
common law.
Moreover, there has always been a close and complementary
relationship between federal law and state law in the area of environmental
protection. Indeed, from the beginning, Congress has been careful to
ensure a continued role for state law in environmental-protection efforts
through the cooperative-federalism model and broad savings clauses to
preserve the ability of states via their common law and statutory law to enact
higher standards than imposed by federal law. 202 However, most scholarly
discussion of the federal-state relationship in environmental law has focused
on state statutory and regulatory environmental-protection efforts, with little
focus on the role of state common law in the federal-state balance.2 5
199. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
IntegratingStandards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 749 n.280 (2006) (citing authorities); Marty
Coyne, Enforcement: Polluters Have Benefited from Lax EPA Enforcement, [10 FEDERAL AGENCIES]
GREENWIRE (ENVTL. AND ENERGY PUBLISHING, LLC) (Oct. 13, 2004) (stating that EPA's use of
lawsuits to address violations of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and other laws dropped
seventy-five percent between the last three years of the Clinton administration and the first

three years of the Bush administration).
200.

See, e.g., Klass, supra note 199, at 750 n.281 (citing authorities); Carolyn Whetzel,

California Legislature Approves Measure to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Statewide, DAILY ENVTL. REP.
(BNA) No. 170 (Sept. 1, 2006) (reporting on an agreement between the California Governor
and Legislature to require significant cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions within the state and lack

of national policy on the issue).
201.

Morriss, supra note 175, at 162; see also id. at 154 (arguing that common lawjudges are

more insulated from interest groups and not subject to agency capture).
202. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 101-02 (discussing the cooperativefederalism model and rare use of federal preemption in environmental law); see also supra note
143 (detailing savings clauses in various federal statutes and caselaw confirming the lack of
federal preemption of state environmental law in various circumstances).
203. See, e.g., Hodas, supra note 200, at 53-57 (discussing state and local regulatory efforts
to address global warming); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental
Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 538-40 (1997) (rejecting the premise
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A federal approach to environmental regulation was originally justified,
in part, by concerns that states would engage in a race to the bottom to
attract business through lessening environmental regulations within their
borders.0 4 While there has been much scholarly debate regarding the
validity of those concerns,
that dispute is not the focus of this Article.
Regardless of whether the original federal effort was necessary, the fact
remains that in many areas of environmental protection, it is the federal
government that has come under fire for failing to protect the environment,
and it is the states that are taking the lead in new environmental-protection
efforts. 206 In addition, the Supreme Court's new federalism revolution has
called into
question Congress's ability under the Constitution to protect the
S•207
environment. Thus, there has been a recent and significant shift from the
federal government to the state government as the source of new leadership
in efforts to come up with innovative solutions to modern environmental
problems.
Indeed, the states recently have been particularly active in efforts to
enact programs and regulations to address air pollution, water pollution,
toxic substances, right-to-know laws, remediation of contaminated property,
auto-emission standards, hazardous and solid waste, and environmental

that states will engage in a race to the bottom if national pollution-control standards are absent
and arguing that states can address many pollution issues on a state regulatory level). See
generally ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997)
(addressing, in part, state and federal roles in regulating public lands, state lands, wildlife
conservation, water rights, and pollution).
204. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 101-03. Other justifications include the federal
government's superior resources and expertise and heightened ability to address national,
interstate, and global issues. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
205.
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 181, at 464-65 (arguing that federal environmental
programs often discourage or obstruct state reforms and that state and local governments are at
the forefront today of developing new environmental solutions); Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom?, " 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271,
271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 570
(1996); Revesz, supra note 127, at 558 (arguing that states are taking the lead on new
environmental initiatives); Revesz, supra note 203, at 535 (arguing that states can regulate
pollution better than the federal government); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1992). See generally Steinzor, supranote 178.
206. See Hodas, supra note 200, at 53-57 (discussing state and local efforts to address global
warming); Revesz, supra note 127, at 558 (concluding that states have taken the lead since the
1990s in attacking important environmental problems by enacting regulations governing
automobile-emissions standards, hazardous waste, municipal solid waste, environmental-impact
statements, and duty to warn, while the federal government has enacted few significant pieces
of legislation.); id. at 630-31 (comparing state efforts and federal efforts); see also supra notes
199-200 and accompanying text (describing criticism of the federal administration for failure
to protect the environment and state initiatives).
207.
See supra Part IV.B.
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review. 208 Today's focus on the states' renewed efforts similarly has centered
primarily on state statutory and regulatory initiatives rather than on state
common law. Less discussion has focused on the extent to which state
common law can take advantage of the wealth of federal and state
environmental2 9standards and data to play a significant role in protecting the
environment.
Common law has significant benefits that are often ignored in the blind
reliance on statutory and regulatory solutions. The common law can evolve
in a reasoned manner, generally insulated from interest groups, and reach
decisions based on sworn, scientific, and focused testimony rather than the
21
0
generalities and anecdotes often present in congressional hearings.
Moreover, local courts (whether state or federal) are often in a better
position to judge the effects of pollution in individual cases given their
proximity to the problem. 2 1 Thus, while congressional action is necessary
for strong, sweeping policy directives, common law can play a significant role
in ensuring that policy statements are used to shape appropriate remedies in

208. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Governor Unveils Plan to Reduce Mercury from Coal-FiredPower
Plants by 90 Percent, 37 ENV'T RE'. 91, 91 (2006) (reporting on the Illinois Governor's state
mercury-reduction plan that would force coal-fired power plants to cut toxic emissions far below
federal targets because "[t]he new federal mercury regulations don't go far enough in
protecting the public from what we know are very dangerous emissions"); Kirsten H. Engel,
Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54,
65-68 (2005) (discussing local and state regulatory initiatives to address global warming in the
face of federal inaction); Revesz, supra note 127, at 583-614 (discussing various state regulatory
initiatives); Dean Scott, Administration to Focus on Voluntary Efforts as More States Move to Regulate
Emissions, 37 ENV'T REP. S-11, S-11-S-16 (2006) (reporting that the federal administration is
continuing to advance voluntary initiatives as the best way to address climate change in 2006,
but California and several other states are moving ahead on their own to set mandatory
emission caps despite federal opposition and litigation by industry).
209. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Some recent work that has focused on
common law efforts, as opposed to statutory and regulatory efforts, includes Thomas 0.
McGarity, Regulation and Litigation: Complementary Tools for EnvironmentalProtection,30 COLUM. J.
ENvrL. L. 371 (2005) (using the example of tort litigation initiated by various states to address
MTBE contamination in groundwater to argue that tort litigation is an important tool in
correcting a regulatory system controlled by special interests); Meiners & Yandle, supra note 143
(arguing that common law coupled with state-level controls could have done a much betterjob
to protect the environment than the federal regulatory system); Thomas W. Merrill, Global
Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005) (discussing the use of lawsuits
by state attorneys general to address carbon-dioxide emissions and global warming); James A.
Sevinsky, Public Nuisance: A Common Law Remedy Among the Statutes, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,

Summer 1990, at 29, 59 (arguing that, as we entered the 1990s, common law principles, if
innovatively applied, would continue to provide remedies for environmental harms).
210. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing arguments in favor of common law
benefits); Meiners et al., supranote 137, at 142-43, 154. As recognized at supra note 163, as state
judicial elections become more politicized,judges are arguably less insulated from lobbying and
political pressures than they might have been at the time Calabresi published his book.
211. See Harrison v. Ind. Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th Cir. 1976)
(describing benefits of common law).
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areas not covered by statute. 1t The common law certainly has shortcomings;
it is retrospective, develops slowly and in a nonuniform manner across
jurisdictions, and thus can rarely provide comprehensive solutions to
pressing national problems. 1 3 Nevertheless, although these shortcomings
highlight the continuing need for statutory and regulatory reform and for
the strong enforcement of existing laws, they in no way negate the common

law's ability to make a real contribution to today's environmental problems.
On a more practical level, common law provides for compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. By contrast, most federal
environmental statutes do not provide for compensatory or punitive
damages, and some federal statutes do not even provide for state or privateparty injunctive relief.214 Moreover, although the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act provide a federal-permit shield, which prevents most federal
enforcement under those laws against parties in compliance with the terms
of their permits, in many jurisdictions a state common law nuisance action
is
2 5
available even if the party is in compliance with a state or federal permit. 1

212. As Calabresi pointed out, if common law courts move the law in a direction the
majority does not favor, Congress or the various state legislatures have always had the power
simply to address the issue directly through legislative action. See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 4.
213. SeePLATERETAL., supra note 140, at 283-84.
214.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (allowing citizen suits under the Clean Water Act for
assessment of civil penalties or imposition of injunctive relief for violation of effluent standards
or limitations, but no right to seek compensatory damages); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (providing
for the recovery of response costs but not for injunctive relief or compensatory damages for
releases of hazardous substances); id. § 7604 (providing right of action to seek civil penalties
and injunctive relief for violation of Clean Air Act statutory provisions, but no right to seek
compensatory damages); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)
(confirming that there is no private right of action under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y (2000), but holding that FIFRA does not
preempt state common law claims that do not challenge the pesticide label). As an example of
limitations on state actions, CERCLA does not provide states with the authority to seek an
injunction to force a responsible private party to remediate a hazardous-waste site even if there
is an imminent threat to human health and the environment. Instead, that authority is limited
to the federal government. As a result, a state seeking to force a cleanup must resort to the
common law of nuisance to obtain injunctive relief. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1049-52 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "injunctive relief under CERCLA [was] not
available to the state," but that an injunction could issue against the defendant under New York
public nuisance law); see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 140, at 165-75 (discussing equitable
relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages available for environmental harms under
the common law); Farber, The Story of Boomer, supra note 172, at 146-47 (noting that the Clean
W"ater Act does not allow pollution victims to recover damages and that nuisance actions remain
available to recover such damages); Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact
of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 905
(2004) (noting that common law claims are necessary to recover for property damage, personal
injury, and punitive damages for actions contaminating soil and groundwater).
215. Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Il. 1981) (holding that a
chemical-waste-disposal site could be a ntisance despite existence of operating permits from a
state environmental agency); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw §§ 2.11-2.12
(1986 & Supp. 2005) (discussing the impact of state and federal statutes on common law
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The goal of this Article, however, is not to argue only that we should
place more emphasis on state common law, but also to investigate to what
extent state common law courts can use federal and state statutes,
regulations, and scientific developments since the 1970s to strengthen
common law as a means of environmental protection. The following sections
provide a review of the caselaw to date and possibilities for its further
advancement.
A.

JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO USE MORAGNE PRINCIPLES IN DEVELOPING STATE
COMMON LAWFOR ENVWRONMENTAL-PROTECTION PURPOSES

This Section reviews caselaw from 1970 through the present to
determine the extent to which courts are utilizing statutes, regulations, and
improved scientific expertise on environmental issues to use common law
for environmental-protection purposes. To the extent courts are doing so,
they are following in the tradition begun by Holmes, Pound, Landis,
Cardozo, and others, and expressed by the Supreme Court in Moragne.
1. Judicial Use of Statutory and Regulatory Policy to Advance
State Common Law
Since the explosion of federal and state environmental statutes began in
the 1970s, courts have used a growing number of statutory and regulatory
standards to develop their state environmental common law of tort on issues
of liability, damages, and injunctive relief. First, courts have increasingly
relied on statutory and regulatory standards to find liability under the
doctrines of negligence per se, nuisance, and strict liability. In fact, the
proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts states on the topic
of "statutory violations as negligence per se" that an actor is negligent if he
or she violates a statute "designed to protect against the type of accident the
actor's conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of

nuisance and concluding that many courts have interpreted the various statutes to allow state
common law claims for nuisance to remain viable despite existence of statute or compliance
with permit issued pursuant to a statute); see Md. Heights Leasing v. Mallinckrodt, 706 S.W.2d
218, 223-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that compliance with federal standards does not
always indicate an absence of negligence); Brown v. County Comm'rs of Scioto County, 622
N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a sewage-treatment plant with
governmental authorization to operate cannot be an absolute statutory nuisance but can be a
qualified statutory nuisance with liability based on negligent creation or maintenance of a
condition that creates an unreasonable risk of harm and injury); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d
63, 67 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) ("Conformance with pollution standards does not preclude a suit in
private nuisance."); Farber, The Story of Boomer, supra note 172, at 146-47 (citing Andrew
Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution,
27 ENvTL. L. 403, 435-536 & nn.207 & 210 (1997)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (providing that
compliance with a permit issued under the Clean Water Act is deemed to be compliance with
federal law); 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (providing that compliance with a permit issued in
accordance with permit requirements of Clean Air Act shall be deemed compliance with
various provisions of the Act).
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persons the statute is designed to protect.
These same principles apply to
claims for nuisance, which also can be based on statutory or regulatory
violations. 21 Thus, if a plaintiff meets these requirements, she may recover
damages or obtain an injunction for violation of a federal, state, or local
statute or ordinance 218 under the doctrine of negligence per se or nuisance,
even if the statute itself does not provide a private right of action. 219
One of the comments to the proposed final draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts states that "courts, exercising their common law authority
to develop tort doctrine, not only should regard the actor's statutory
violation as evidence admissible against the actor, but should treat that
violation as actually determining the actor's negligence."2 2 0 Thus, violation
of the statute is negligence per se. 22 This language is much more direct than
that used in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, perhaps because, as another
comment to the proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
recognizes, the significance of negligence per se "has expanded in recent
decades,
as, 222the number of statutory and regulatory controls has substantially
•
increased.
This trend can be found in judicial decisions since the 1970s,
where courts have used newly enacted state and federal environmental
standards to help define the duty of care in common law negligence claims
and identify activities that constitute nuisances2 and/or are abnormally
dangerous for purposes of applying strict liability.

11

216.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14

217.

WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 415 (3d ed. 2000)

(Proposed Final Draft 2005).

(noting that the violation of a statute is one way to establish a nuisance).
218. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (stating
that the section applies equally to regulations adopted by state administrative bodies,
ordinances adopted by local councils, and federal statutes, as well as regulations promulgated
by federal administrative agencies).
219. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. e (1979) (stating that at
common law, violations of statutes and regulations can be used to establish both negligence per
se and nuisance).
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
221. Id.
222. Compare id. cmt. d, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (stating that the court
'may" adopt a legislative enactment or administrative regulation as the standard of care under
certain circumstances).
223. See, e.g.,
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050-52 (2d Cir. 1985)
(allowing the state to establish public nuisance and obtain injunctive relief based on violations
of various state laws relating to storage and disposal of hazardous waste); Akzo Coatings of Am.,
Inc. v. Am. Renovating, 842 F. Supp. 267, 273 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (allowing plaintiffs to establish
nuisance and recover damages for violation of CERCLA provisions regarding arranging for
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances); Hendler v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611, 61517 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1997) (using the California Health and Safety Code to establish that
contamination of groundwater is a public nuisance); Sanchez v. General Urban Corp., 19 Conn.
L. Rptr. 97 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (denying a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages
based on child's ingestion of lead-based paint and holding that violation of regulatory
requirements relating to lead paint can be used to establish negligence per se and absolute
nuisance); Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 834-41 (111.1981) (relying on
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This trend is particularly notable in the development of common law
strict liability in the context of environmental contamination. As a matter of
common law, courts generally impose strict liability for harm either under
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher24 or under the Restatement (Second) of
225S
Torts. Rylands involved a defendant who constructed a reservoir on his
land that burst and damaged his neighbor's land. In an 1868 decision, the
English House of Lords held that the defendant was liable without a showing
of negligence because he had brought something "unnatural" onto his land
that caused damage.226
In contrast to the Rylands standard, under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, a defendant is subject to strict liability if the plaintiff establishes the
activity that caused the harm is "abnormally dangerous. 2 2 7 The court
decides this question as a matter of law based on balancing (1) whether the
activity involves a high degree of risk of harm; (2) whether the gravity of
harm from the activity is likely to be great; (3) whether the risk cannot be
eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care; (4) whether the activity
is not a matter of common usage; (5) whether the activity is inappropriate
where it occurs; and (6) the value of the activity to the
for the place
228
community.
In recent years, commentators have argued that courts have, for the
most part, abandoned common law strict liability in favor of negligence as
the dominant tort theory, apart from historic applications of strict liability
federal regulations governing use and disposal of PCBs and state regulations governing landfill
operations to find that a landfill's operations constituted a nuisance); Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d
1255, 1265-68 (Or. 1982) (using state statutory prohibition and regulations on field burning to
find that defendant's field burning, which resulted in loss to the plaintiff, was an abnormally
dangerous activity subject to strict liability); Bella v. Aurora Air, 566 P.2d 489, 495 (Or. 1977)

(holding that in light of state legislation regulating aerial spraying of pesticides, defendant's
aerial-spraying activities were abnormally dangerous and subject to strict liability); Pennsylvania
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 882-83 (Pa. 1974) (allowing the use of state constitution
and Clean Streams Law to establish public nuisance); Branch v. W. Petroleum Inc., 657 P.2d
267, 272-76 (Utah 1982) (finding that violation of state water-pollution law supports nuisance
per se and that defendant's oil wells were an abnormally dangerous activity and thus subject to
strict liability); see also Klass, supra note 214, at 942-57 (discussing cases finding activities
resulting in environmental contamination abnormally dangerous based in part on existence of
CERCLA and state laws regulating release of hazardous substances). But see Schwartzman v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 857 F. Supp. 838, 848-51 (D.N.M. 1994) (holding that the
plaintiff could not recover damages under negligence per se based on statutory violations
because that would provide the plaintiff with a remedy not contemplated by the legislature);
Grube v. Daun, 570 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Wis. 1997) (holding that regulation of underground
storage tanks shows storage of gasoline can be conducted safely and thus strict liability is not
appropriate).
224. Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1868).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1979) (providing for strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities).
226. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. at 330.
227.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §

228.

Id. § 520.

519.
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for traditionally abnormally dangerous activities, such as blasting.2 9
However, since the enactment of CERCLA in 1980, which imposes strict
liability for the release of hazardous substances, 2310courts have increasingly
imposed common law strict liability under Rylands or the Restatement in
Indeed, when the
cases involving environmental contamination.
Restatement Reporters drafted the Restatement (Third) of Torts for
abnormally dangerous activities, virtually the only new category of cases
given special mention in the commentary was that of environmental
contamination. 32
This new inclusion can be explained by courts looking to the strictliability standard in CERCLA to inform common law and find strict liability
as a matter of common law in cases involving environmental
contamination. 33 Such decisions are significant because a plaintiff's remedy
under CERCLA is limited to the recovery of costs to remediate a release of
hazardous substances. If the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal
injury, diminution in value to property, lost profits, or punitive damages, she
must obtain such relief under common law.234 For obvious reasons, the most
powerful common law vehicle for recovering such damages is strict liability
because the plaintiff need not prove the defendant was negligent or
otherwise at fault. In relying on CERCLA to "update" a state's common law
strict-liability doctrine in the area of environmental contamination, courts

See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally DangerousActivity: The Negligence
229.
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 597, 598 (1999) (arguing that strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities "has evolved to the point of near extinction because courts have concluded
that the negligence system functions effectively to deter the serious risks posed by the activities
involved"); James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REv. 377, 405
(2002) (arguing that negligence should remain the dominant principle of American tort law
and that attempts to hold commercial enterprises strictly liable for harm are not viable because
such liability disputes would be unadjudicable, risks of loss would be uninsurable, and victims
who are purchasers and consumers are best parties to be responsible for insuring against
residual accident losses); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 221
(1973) (arguing that application of broad strict-liability theory is not economically efficient and
imposes unavoidable costs on society without sufficient social value); see also Ind. Harbor Belt
R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that negligence is
more efficient and preferable to strict liability in all cases except where it is impossible to
conduct the activity safely).
230. Plaintiffs in environmental-contamination cases often couple a CERCLA claim to
recover costs of response with state common law claims for strict liability, negligence, or
nuisance in order to seek compensatory damages, personal-injury damages, or punitive
damages for which CERCILA provides no recovery. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing strict liability under CERCLA); United States v. ChemDyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (same).
231.

See Klass, supra note 214, at 957-61.

232.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. k, illus. 2 (Proposed Final Draft 2005).

233.

See Klass, supra note 214, at 957-61.

234.

Id. at 905.
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are relying on related statutes to develop common law to reflect current
norms and provide new coherence and consistency in that area of the law.
As another example, courts have looked to the growing number of
environmental standards, particularly those addressing soil and groundwater
cleanup, to modify common law theories of damages and allow recovery for
permanent "environmental stigma" damages, in addition to costs of
cleanup.235 Historically, many jurisdictions allowed a plaintiff whose property
was subject to damage to recover the lesser of the cost of repair or
diminution in value of the property.2

36

Which type of recovery was allowed

on whether the damages were deemed "temporary" or
also could depend
"permanent."23 7 As courts addressed more and more cases involving claims
of nuisance, negligence, and strict liability for damages due to contaminated
soil and groundwater, the distinction between temporary and permanent
damages became more difficult to ascertain. When was a property truly
clean? If the cleanup would take more than twenty years to complete, were
those damages temporary or permanent? Was a plaintiff entitled to any
recovery if the defendant was conducting remediation on the plaintiffs

235. See, e.g., Mel Foster Co. Props. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa 1988) (noting
that as scientific progress allows for "society to successfully clean up pollution once thought to
be permanent," it becomes easier to determine damages for liability); Terra-Prods., Inc., v. Kraft
Gen. Foods, 653 N.E.2d 89, 92-94 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995) (applying a "diminution in fair market
value analysis" to environmental damage); Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238,
1245-48 (Utah 1998) (determining the extent of the defendant's invasion and the gravity of the
environmental damage to ascertain liability). "Environmental stigma" is an adverse impact on
the value of a property based on the market's perception that the property poses an
environmental risk. See UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE, Advisory
Op. 9, at 143-45 (Appraisal Standards Bd. 2003) (defining "environmental stigma" as "an
adverse effect on property value produced by the market's perception of increased
environmental risk due to contamination"). Such risk may be due to fear of potential liability
for cleanup costs, potential liability to third parties affected by existing or prior contamination,
or concerns regarding the ability to obtain financing for the property. See Dealers Mfg. Co. v.
County of Anoka, 615 N.W.2d 76, 77 n.1 (Minn. 2000) (citing Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of
ContaminatedProperties,56 APPRAISALJ. 7, 7-8 (1988)).
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 & cmt. b (1979) (stating that if a plaintiff
is entitled to judgment from harm to land not resulting in total destruction of the property, that
plaintiff can recover the difference between the value of land before and after the harm (i.e.,
diminution in value) or the reasonable cost of restoration, but if cost of restoration far exceeds
diminution in value or total value of the property, limiting the plaintiff's remedy to diminution
in value may be appropriate). But see Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1309
(Colo. 1986) (refusing to hold as a bright-line rule that a plaintiff's repair costs may not exceed
the diminution in value of the property caused by the harm or even the pretort value of the
property); Reeser v. Weaver Bros., 605 N.E.2d 1271, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (same);
MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 86, at 255-59 (discussing the Restatement and cases).
237. See, e.g., Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, 560 A.2d 809, 812-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(holding that plaintiff may recover damages for diminution in property only if the damage is
permanent, otherwise plaintiff should recover only the cost of repair); MADDEN & BOSTON,
supra note 86, at 266-67 (stating that the distinction between temporary and permanent
damages is relevant because historically if injury to land is permanent, the owner may recover
diminution in value, but not if the damage is temporary).
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property? To address these questions, courts began awarding stigma
damages in a variety of cases in the late 1980s. The developments in this area
drew heavily on the new statutory liabilities for property contamination that
CERCLA and state law had begun imposing on a wide range of property
238
owners.
For instance, in 1988, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the proper
measure of damages for contaminated property can be diminution in the
market value of the property even if the nuisance is classified as temporary
239
and the pollution has been abated. In so holding, the court rejected the
distinction between temporary and permanent nuisances for purposes of
determining the measure of damages. The court explained that
groundwater contamination "does not fit neatly into a category as either a
temporary or permanent nuisance. ',2 4 As a result, the court found that prior
cases relying on that distinction were simply "not instructive in dealing with
chemical pollution to real estate which will remain in the soil for an
indefinite period of time."24'
The court concluded that chemical contamination contains aspects of
both a permanent and a temporary nuisance. This is because even though
the contamination will ultimately be abated, it will continue for an indefinite
but significant period of time, thus constituting a damage to the ground
itself.24 2 Moreover, while changing technologies and scientific advances allow

for the cleanup of pollution once thought to be permanent, they also reveal
"hidden dangers in chemicals once thought to be safe."243 Thus, the court
held that when a nuisance results in contamination for an indefinite period
of time, the plaintiff can recover diminution in the market value of the
property even when the source of the contamination has been abated or the
244
nuisance is classified as temporary.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court held in 1998 that plaintiffs seeking
diminution in property value from a gas station under theories of trespass
and nuisance could recover such damages for stigma to the property even
245
after the defendants remediated the contamination. In doing so, the court
recognized the significant burdens CERCLA and other laws were now

238. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); Klass, supra note 214, at 920-23
(discussing enactment of CERCLA in 1980 and basic liability provisions).
239. Mel Foster Co. Props. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa 1988).
240. Id. at 174.
241.
Id.

242.

Id.

243. Id. at 175.
244. Mel Foster Co. Props., 427 N.W.2d at 175; see also Terra-Prods. v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 653
N.E.2d 89, 92-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a plaintiff
could not recover environmental-stigma damages because damage was temporary and
defendant had already remediated the property).
245. Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1238 (Utah 1998).
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imposing on contaminated properties, leaving them in financial limbo for
years, if not decades, and significantly reducing their market value.
In support of the plaintiffs' damages claims, fact and expert witnesses
testified that public perception of contaminated properties worsened in the
area after 1990 when buyers became more sophisticated about
environmental contamination and recognized the legal liability associated
with such contamination.246 These witnesses also referred to regulatory
changes that increased the impact of environmental contamination on
property values.247 Based on this evidence, the court reversed the lower
court's summary-judgment decision for the defendant and directed the trial
court to admit the testimony on environmental stigma for purposes of
calculating damages.248
These cases demonstrate that courts have altered their common law
doctrines for property damage to recognize the new liability scheme and
market conditions that CERCLA and state laws have created relating to the
cleanup of contaminated property. Once Congress and state legislatures
imposed strict, joint, and several liability for the release of hazardous
substances, any potential landowner could be held responsible for millions
of dollars of cleanup costs even if they were not responsible for the
contamination and were unaware of it when they purchased the property. 249
These legal developments had a significant impact on the market for
contaminated properties, and real estate appraisers began to study the
concept of environmental stigma for the first time soon after CERCLA's
enactment. 25° At the same time, plaintiffs began presenting such testimony,
and the courts altered the common law of remedies to reflect these changes
in the market brought about by the federal and state environmental laws. 1

246. Id. at 1247.
247. Id.
248.
Id. at 1247-48.
249. See, e.g., CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (enumerating parties responsible for
costs of response associated with hazardous substances); PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 35, at 22627, 257-58 (discussing CERCLA liability provisions); Klass, supranote 214, at 920-21 (same).
250. The concept of environmental stigma did not even exist in the real-estate appraisal
literature until the mid-1980s and was not subject to any significant treatment until the 1990s.
See William N. Kinnard, Jr. & Elaine M. Worzala, How North American Appraisers Value
Contaminated Property and Associated Stigma, 67 APPRAISAL J. 269, 270 (1999) (stating that the
literature on the effects of contamination on real property in the United States dates from
approximately 1984, but that only a handful of articles and papers appeared before 1991).
251.
While most courts appear to require some initial physical impact to the plaintiffs
property to recover for environmental stigma, at least one state supreme court has noted that
environmental stigma is recoverable even in the absence of physical impact. See Dealers Mfg.
Co. v. County of Anoka, 615 N.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Minn. 2000) (stating that stigma may attach to
property that is not itself contaminated); MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 86, at 269 ("The cases
awarding stigma damages appear to be nearly uniform in demanding some actual physical
injury to the property as a precondition of recovery."); see also E. Jean Johnson, Environmental
Stigma Damages: Speculative Damages in Environmental Tort Cases, 15 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
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On the whole, courts' use of the new environmental statutory and
regulatory standards to inform and develop the law of nuisance, negligence,
and strict liability shows the dynamic potential of common law to address
modern-day concerns. As stated earlier, state common law claims cannot and
should not substitute for strong federal legislation and regulation, which can
control pollution more broadly without many of the evidentiary
requirements needed to establish common law violations. Nevertheless, by
integrating statutory and regulatory standards into state common law, the
common law can work side by side with the statutory and regulatory
framework to provide incentives to control pollution and protect the
environment.
2. Judicial Use of New Data and Expertise to Advance State Common Law
The new environmental laws of the 1970s and 1980s brought with them
not only new liability standards and policy directives but also the creation of
new expertise and data in areas including air pollution, water pollution,
waste disposal, environmental assessment, and remediation techniques. This
Section explores how courts have used this new statutory-driven expertise
and data in developing common law doctrines related to environmental
protection and contamination, including nuisance, trespass, strict liability,
and the public trust doctrine. Once again, even though courts generally are
not explicit about how and why they are using this new information to move
the common law forward, a review of the holdings and reasoning of these
cases shows this trend.
As noted earlier, one of the primary concerns of the Boomer court in
refusing equitable relief on the plaintiffs' nuisance claim was the lack of
data, standards, and scientific evidence that would allow the court to
evaluate adequately the merits of the case.2252 Justice Holmes expressed2 5a3
similar concern in the interstate water-pollution case of Missouri v. Illinois.
-

In this case, the Supreme Court denied Missouri's request to enjoin the
discharge of Chicago sewage, which Chicago had recently engineered to
flow away from Lake Michigan and into the Mississippi River by reversing the
flow of the Chicago River. The Court held that Missouri could not establish
a causal connection between the sewage discharges and an increase in
pollution and disease. 54
In reaching this decision, Holmes noted this was not "a nuisance of the
simple kind that was known to the older common law" because there was no
visible or olfactory evidence of contamination and because the additional

185, 189-230 (1996) (discussing stigma damages and judicial decisions awarding stigma

damages).
252.
253.

Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
Missouriv. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).

254.

Id. at 526.
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volumes of water from Lake Michigan flowing
• . . into
.255 the river had arguably
improved

the water quality of the MiSSiSSippi..

The

Court reviewed

evidence and studies that typhoid fever had increased in Missouri since the
addition of Chicago sewage and concluded that the studies were
inconclusive. 256 Ultimately, Holmes recognized that "[w]hat the future may
develop of course we cannot tell " 257 but that the plaintiff's case failed for lack
25
of causation and because it depended upon "an inference of the unseen. 8
Thus, the Boomer court's concern over imposing injunctive relief based on
limited science and data certainly was not a new concern.
However, this should be of much less importance today. The new
federal and state environmental statutes of the 1970s and 1980s established
expert agencies and funding for vast numbers of studies and data-collection
opportunities in areas of air pollution, water pollution, toxic substances,
remediation, and pollution-control techniques. Professor Richard Revesz has
documented how this growth in expertise has increased the competence and
experience of state and local environmental officials who establish and
implement state statutory and regulatory policy.

259

One can observe this

same phenomenon in the ability of increasingly qualified expert witnesses in
environmental lawsuits to provide the scientific expertise and data needed to
overcome, at least in part, the concerns expressed in Boomer and Missouri
and to develop common law tort theories to address environmental harm.
For instance, the Washington Supreme Court held in 1985 that its
common law rule that microscopic particles could be a nuisance but not a
trespass because of the lack of an observable and direct physical invasion no
longer made sense in modern, scientific times. 26 0 The court agreed that the
trespassory consequences of such particles were no less "direct" even if the
mechanism of delivery was more complex or the particles were not visible to
the naked eye. 26 1 Likewise, the NewJersey Supreme Court in 1983 used the
growing knowledge of the hazards of toxic wastes, various federal reports on
the harm pollution caused to the environment, and the growing societal
problem of dumping untreated waste in New Jersey to hold that actions
resulting in mercury pollution of state waterways were abnormally dangerous
2
and subject to strict liability.

255.
256.
257.

Id. at 522.
Id. at 522-26.
Id. at 526.

258.

Missouri, 200 U.S. at 522.

259. Revesz, supra note 127, at 626-30.
260. Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 787-89 (Wash. 1985) (citing Martin
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.13 (1977)); see alsoJ.H. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523,

526-29 (Ala. 1979) (contrasting modern trespass and nuisance tests with common law rules).
261.
262.

Bradley, 709 P.2d at 787-89.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150, 492-93 (NJ. 1983).
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An Illinois case in 1981 found that a chemical-waste disposal site was a
nuisance based in large part on the potential risks of harm from
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") at the site. 63 The court placed
significance on the growing knowledge of the dangers of PCBs and the fact
that they were banned beginning in 1979.264 A federal court in Kentucky in
1993 also relied on the increasing evidence and documentation regarding
the dangers of PCBs in holding that a gas-pipeline company using PCBs
265
could be strictly liable for contamination of nearby properties.
Courts have also relied on the growth of environmental knowledge to
use common law theories such as the public trust doctrine2 66 to protect
wetlands and other resources from development pressures. For instance, as
early as the 1970s, state courts used the public trust doctrine to protect
inland wetlands and tidelands based on the growing recognition that one of
their most important uses is "preservation of those lands in their natural
state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
,,267
More recently, in 2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court extended
marine life.
the scope of the public trust doctrine to groundwater based on the fact that
"[m]odern science and technology have discredited the surface-ground
dichotomy" and that there was no sense in "adhering to artificial
distinctions" not supported by "practical realities."2 , Courts in states with
large coastal areas have also used the public trust doctrine in recent years to
support erosion-control measures or to prevent development in coastal
areas. These courts have affirmed state action in this arena based on the
263. Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981).
264. Id. at 828-31.
265. See generally Fletcher v. Tenneco, Civ. No. 91-118, 1993 WL 86561 (E.D. Ky., Feb. 22,
1993). The published version of this opinion was originally found at 816 F. Supp. 1186, but was
subsequently withdrawn from the bound volume at the request of the court as a result of a
settlement between the parties. Telephone Interview with W. Patrick Murray, Counsel for
Plaintiffs (Mar. 17, 2004).
266. The "public trust doctrine" has its origins in Roman and English law and requires
states to hold navigable waters and the submerged lands under navigable waters "in trust" for
the citizens of the state. Since the 1970s, it has been expanded in some jurisdictions to protect
wetlands, species habitat, parkland, and drinking-water resources. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note
260, § 2.16.
267. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); see also Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336
N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), rev'd on other groundssub nom. People v. Poveromo, 359
N.Y.S.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (stating in the context of discussing the public trust
doctrine that "[w]e now know that wetlands perform useful functions" and act "as a buffer
against the ravages of the sea, cleanser of the incoming tide, a base for the marine food chain,
nesting grounds for birds and particularly endangered species"); Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972) (stating that while swamps and wetlands were once considered
"wasteland," people have become "more sophisticated" and realize that these resources "serve a
vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water
in our lakes and streams").
In reWater Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000).
268.
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threat to national resources that is "not just environmental" but also critical
to "the health, safety, and welfare of our people, as coastal erosion removes
an important barrier " between large populations and ever-threatening
hurricanes and storms. ,269

These cases show that courts are using new knowledge about wetlands,
marshes, and other water resources once considered useless or dangerous
swamp lands to protect those lands through the historic common law public
trust doctrine. In doing so, courts are using their common law powers under
their own state law to protect human health and the environment based on
new information generated largely by the vast federal and state regulatory
system that now governs these resources.
Finally, the availability of more sophisticated expert testimony
stemming from new regulatory expertise has allowed courts more easily to
enjoin activities that may harm the environment. For instance, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1996 enjoined the construction and operation
of a landfill under a claim of anticipatory nuisance based on expert
testimony involving water-resource engineering, hydraulics, hydrology,
remediation techniques, and modern-day landfill technology."7 The court's
detailed analysis of the expert testimony helps illustrate just how far science
and expertise in the area of pollution control have come since the Boomer
era of the 1970s.271

For example, the court focused on the fact that one of the plaintiffs
experts not only was a professional engineer with a career working for the
government, teaching at universities, and working in the private sector, but
also had considerable experience in the design and construction of
hazardous and solid-waste landfills. 272 Such experience, of course, would be
gained primarily after the enactment of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA") 273 in 1976, which established requirements for the
storage and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. As a result of the growing
expertise of individuals in environmental science and the vastly increased
quality and quantity of data, common law courts need not abstain from

269. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101 (La. 2004) (finding that a diversion project that
would impact private interests in oyster beds was not an unconstitutional taking in part because
the project promoted protection of public trust resources); see also Parker v. New Hanover
County, 619 S.E.2d 868, 875-76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a special assessment for an
inlet-relocation project was not unconstitutional based in part on the public trust doctrine and
noting the importance of North Carolina's coastal areas and the concerns related to recent
hurricanes). These judicial concerns were clearly born out by the massive disaster resulting
from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3, 16-17 (2006) (discussing the impact of historic development and erosion as

part of the physical challenges facing New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina).
270.

Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 925 P.2d 546, 552-53 (Okla. 1996).

271.
272.

Id. at 550-53.
Id. at 550-52.

273.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
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deciding "hard" environmental cases for lack of sufficient expertise or
evidence.
B. DEVELOPING STATE COMMONLA WIN THE AGE OFTHE REGULA TORY STA TE TO
INCREASE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONAND CREA TEA NEW COHERENCEIN THE LA W
In most of the cases discussed above, private parties relied on common
law tort theories to obtain damages and injunctive relief for personal injury
or property damages. 274 By contrast, since the 1980s, state governments
could often more easily rely on their authority under the federal
environmental statutes to achieve their environmental goals. 75 In the last
few years, however, states have been increasingly frustrated that the federal
government no longer has environmental protection as a priority,
and thus,
276
policy.
environmental
own
their
setting
in
active
more
are
states
Recent examples of this phenomenon at a statutory level are the efforts
of California and several Northeastern states to set vehicle greenhouse-gas
emission standards, the Northeastern regional carbon dioxide cap-and-trade
program, state carbon dioxide emissions limits for power plants, multistate
lawsuits to compel federal carbon dioxide regulations, and new state
mercury-reduction requirements that are far more stringent than federal
277
standards.
While these efforts (primarily in the area of air pollution) are
significant, the same phenomenon can be seen equally in recent state efforts
to use their own state courts and common law to achieve environmental
goals. For instance, in 1999, the State of Rhode Island filed the first lawsuit

274. An exception to that generalization is a case like New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985), where the state used the common law to obtain injunctive relief to force
remediation where CERCLA did not provide such a remedy for states.
275.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 35, at 101 (discussing the model of "cooperative
federalism" established in most federal environmental statutes encouraging state governments
to assume authority for federal programs within their states).
276.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also Carolyn Whetzel, California, United
Kingdom Agree on Plan to Address Environmental, Economic Issues, DAILY ENVTL. REP. (BNA) No. 147
(Aug. 1, 2006), at A8 (discussing the agreement between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to address climate change and the Governor's
written statement that "California will not wait for our federal government to take strong action
on global warming").
277.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the EPA has
authority to decline to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act in response to a state
petition to the EPA asking it to undertake such regulation), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006);
Bologna, supra note 208, at 91 (reporting on Illinois Governor's state mercury-reduction plan
that would force coal-fired power plants to cut toxic emissions far below federal targets because
"[tihe new federal mercury regulations don't go far enough in protecting the public from what
we know are very dangerous emissions"); Scott, supra note 208, at S-11-S-16 (discussing the
efforts of California and several other states to set binding reductions on carbon-dioxide
emissions and air toxics); Kathy Lundy Springuel, Governor Unveils Draft Rule to Cut Emissions
from Coal-Fired Plants, 21 TOxICS L. REP. (BNA) 61 (Jan. 19, 2006) (reporting on the Maryland
Governor's draft plan to cut emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and mercury far
beyond federal requirements).
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by a state against the lead-paint industry to require the industry to pay for
inspection, testing, and remediation under the state's common law of
nuisance. 28 In 2006, North Carolina filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee
Valley Authority claiming that emissions from plants owned by the federal
power authority
in several states were harming individuals and the
279
economy.
The suits are being brought under the source states' publicnuisance laws.
On a broader scope, states and municipalities are attempting to address
massive groundwater-contamination problems from the use of the gasoline
additive methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE") in the face of federal
inaction .2' The EPA approved MTBE as a fuel additive in 1979 to replace
lead and then, in 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments required petroleum
companies to market reformulated gasoline in certain markets with
significant air pollution, increasing the market for and use of MTBE
nationwide. 211 In the late 1990s, however, studies showed significant MTBE
contamination in groundwater supplies across the country and a potential
carcinogenic risk to humans from MTBE. 2812 MTBE contamination is very
difficult to remediate, and current estimates on the cost of cleanup
nationwide range from $25 billion to $85 billion. 2813 Currently, California,
2814
New York, and six other states have banned the use of MTBE. However,
the EPA has refused to ban or limit MTBE under the Toxic Substances
Control Act despite issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
the topic in 2000.85
In addition to regulatory efforts limiting the prospective use of MTBE,
states and municipalities are using common law tort theories to address
278. Martha Kessler, Rhode IslandJudge Refuses to Step Aside in State's Suit Against Lead Paint
Makers, 20 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 793, 793-94 (Sept. 1, 2005).
279. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (denying a
motion to dismiss and allowing state nuisance claim to proceed); Andrew M. Ballard, North
Carolina Lawsuit Against TVA Alleges Harm from Power Plant Emissions, 37 ENv'T REP. 221, 221
(2006).
280. See infra notes 284, 286-91 and accompanying text.
281. New Hampshire v. Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 527 (N.H. 2006) (detailing the history of
MTBE use in gasoline); Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in NationalEnvironmental
Law Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 403, 404-05 (2005). See generally Thomas 0. McGarity,
Regulation and Litigation: Complementary Tools for EnvironmentalProtection, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
371 (2005) (detailing the regulatory history of MTBE and evidence of adverse health impacts
and groundwater-pollution problems).
282. See Press Release, Envtl. Working Group, EPA Draft Says MTBE a "Likely" Cause of
Cancer (July 11, 2005), http://www.ewg.org/issues/MTBE/20050711/index.php (last visited
Jan. 25, 2007) (discussing EPA draft risk assessment in 2005 stating MTBE is a "likely" cause of
cancer).
283. See Gov't Affairs Staff, Am. Water Works Ass'n, Two Updated Analyses Pin MTBE Clean
Up Costs
Between
$25-$85
Billion
(June
21,
2005), http://www.awwa.org/
Communications/news/index.cfm?ArticleID=459 (discussing estimated cleanup costs).
284. See McGarity, supra note 281, at 379-80 & n.46.
285. Id. at 393-94.
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MTBE contamination. Municipalities and other water providers in several
states are in the midst of a multidistrict lawsuit consolidated in the Southern
District of New York against various gasoline producers based on claims of
nuisance, negligence, trespass, and other state common law and statutory
theories to recover for contamination or threatened contamination of
groundwater by MTBE. s6
Likewise, the South Lake Tahoe Public Utility District sued several
major gasoline companies in 1998 after MTBE pollution forced it to close a
third of its drinking-water wells near Lake Tahoe, California.8 7 In August
2002, the parties reached a settlement after a ten-month jury trial, in which
the defendant companies agreed to pay $69 million to remediate the
contaminated wells. 2ss Prior to the settlement, the jury had found that the

defendants had knowingly placed a defective product on the market when
they began selling gasoline with MTBE, potentially exposing the companies
to billions of dollars in cleanup costs and punitive damages.8 9 States, in
addition to local governments, have brought lawsuits to recover for MTBE
contamination. The State of New Hampshire filed suit in New Hampshire
state court in 2003 for claims including negligent water pollution and strict
products liability against numerous gasoline manufacturers and distributors
seeking damages and injunctive relief for contaminating the groundwater of
all but one county in the state. 290 These public-entity lawsuits are in addition
to the numerous lawsuits brought by private parties for MTBE
contamination. State and other public entities are resorting to state
common law to achieve their goals in a manner not generally seen since
prior to the 1970s.29 1
286.

In re MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
287.
Complaint, S. Tahoe Pub. Util. Dist. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 999128 (San Fran.
Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1998), available at http://www.sftc.org (follow "Case Number Query"
hyperlink and enter No. 999128); Jane Kay, 2 Oil Giants Deceived Public on MTBE's Hazards,Jury
Finds,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 2002, at Al.

288. Tyler Cunningham, Oil Companies Settle Lawsuit over MTBE in Lake Tahoe--the LongRunning Case Will Not Mark a Legal PrecedentBecause of the Deal, but Will Surely Have a Wide Impact,
S.F. DAILYJ., Aug. 6, 2002.
289.
Kay, supra note 287, at Al.
290.
New Hampshire v. Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 531-32 (N.H. 2006) (declaring that the state
MTBE suit should displace separate similar suits by municipalities under the doctrine of parens
patriae and setting forth claims in a suit by the state against gasoline-company defendants). The
State of New Hampshire alleged that MTBE was present in hundreds of public water systems
and approximately 40,000 private water supplies. Id. at 529-30.
291.

For a chart showing the lawsuits brought by public water supplies, see EWG ACTION

FUND, LIKE OIL AND WATER: AS CONGRESS CONSIDERS LEGAL IMMUNITY FOR OIL COMPANIES

MORE COMMUNITIES Go TO COURT OVER MTBE POLLUTION, http://www.ewg.org/reports/
oilandwater/lawsuits.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). For data on the number of water systems
and populations affected by MTBE contamination, see EWG ACTION FUND, LIKE OIL AND
WAATER: As CONGRESS CONSIDERS LEGAL IMMUNITY FOR OIL COMPANIES MORE COMMUNITIES GO

TO COURT OVER MTBE POLLUTION, http://www.ewg.org/reports/oilandwater/part2.php

(last

visited Jan. 25, 2007). See also Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National
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On the whole, it is true that state common law initiatives may necessarily
be more limited in scope than federal common law, which has the potential
to address larger, multistate pollution issues. However, Milwaukee II has
foreclosed the use of federal common law nuisance for interstate water
pollution, and the recent efforts of states to use federal common law
nuisance for interstate air pollution have not been successful, although that
may change on appeal or with future suits. 292 As a result, careful
consideration of targeted state common law efforts, which can rest on
principles of the "new federalism," can have significant effects on
environmental quality. Recent efforts on MTBE contamination, greenhousegas control, and lead-paint issues are merely examples of how nuisance,
negligence, strict liability, and other state common law claims can at least
partially address the current issues faced by public entities as they did in the
1980s and 1990s for private parties seeking to obtain relief beyond that
provided by environmental statutory law.
There are, to be sure, potential roadblocks that could prevent using
state common law for progressive change. Despite the Supreme Court's
recent embrace of "new federalism" principles, there is increased political
pressure to invoke federal authority to rein in judicial protection of citizens
in environmental and other cases through state law. One example is the U.S.
Justice Department's recent arguments to the Supreme Court that federal
pesticide law should preempt state statutory and common law claims for
damages. 293 Another is the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's attempt to
use new federal drug-labeling regulations to preempt state law failure-towarn claims for recovering damages for injury. Moreover, it was only at the
Environmental Policy, Groundwater Pollution Panel, supra note 200, at 409 (discussing MTBE
lawsuits nationwide).
292. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(dismissing on "political question" grounds an action by several states against Midwestern power
plants for failure to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions under federal common law of nuisance);
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
293. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (rejecting the Justice
Department's argument in favor of broad FIFRA preemption of state law tort claims for

damages).
294.

See, e.g., Witczak v. Pfizer, 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (D. Minn. 2005) (rejecting a drug

manufacturer's preemption argument under a prior FDA rule in the plaintiffs failure-to-warn
claim to recover for a suicide alleged to be associated with the drug Zoloft and stating that the

Justice Department's position that such claims were preempted did not have the force of law,
and that FDA regulations provided a floor, but not a ceiling, for disclosure of drug-safety
information); Colacicco v. Apotex, 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that

federal drug law and FDA labeling regulations impliedly preempt common law claims based on
inadequate labeling); Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-3936 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (stating that both old-rule and new-rule FDA approval
of labeling under federal law preempts conflicting or contrary state law, and thus acts as both a
"floor" and a "ceiling" with regard to information required to be provided by manufacturers to
consumers, despite judicial decisions to the contrary); Letter from Nat'l Conference of State
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last minute that Congress removed a provision of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 that would have shielded gasoline manufacturers from product-liability
lawsuits associated with MTBE contamination.29" Similar efforts likely will be
seen in the future, particularly as costs associated with MTBE and other
environmental liabilities rise. Such use of federal law, particularly in the
environmental area, is nothing new. Corporate interests were strong
supporters of certain major federal environmental initiatives such as the
Clean Air Act because they much preferred national, uniform standards that
they could more easily influence through the federal legislative process than
a patchwork of state requirements, many of which had the potential to be far
96
more stringent than those ultimately enacted on a federal level.2
Thus, the balance between the states and the federal government over
setting and implementing environmental policy will continue to shift in the
years ahead. Future developments in engineering and science along with
changing attitudes toward environmental problems such as global warming
will also affect whether federal and state governments will increase
protection for the environment or decrease it in favor of minimizing the
economic effects on business. Within this big picture of environmental law
and policy, however, is the central role courts have played and will continue
to play in developing common law to address current needs with regard to
environmental protection and compensation for environmental harms. The
building blocks for state common law are there for those who wish to use
them as a progressive force. Courts and litigants need only look for guidance
in the writings of Pound, Cardozo, Landis, and others, along with judicial
application of their work starting with Moragne and continuing with more
recent developments in state common law relating to trespass, strict liability,
stigma damages, and the public trust doctrine. Such common law
development not only will update historic legal theories to address modern
problems, but can do so in a way that integrates statutes and common law
into a more coherent whole.
Legislatures to Hon. Mike Leavitt, Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Jan. 13,
2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2O06/060113Leavitt.htm (expressing
opposition to inclusion of language in final FDA rule that would seek to preempt state product
liability laws).
295.
See Debra DeHaney-Howard, Major Victory for Mayors on MTBE Liability Protection,
U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/

us.mayornewspaper/documen ts/08_08_05/MTBE.asp.
296.

See, e.g., PLATER ET AL., supra note

140, at 299-300

(discussing scenarios where

industries lobby Congress to enact federal standards over fear of more stringent state standards
in areas of auto emissions, pesticide regulations, and control of additives in laundry detergent
and gasoline); Elliott et al., supra note 126, at 330-33 (explaining how auto industry and softcoal industry reversed course to support federal air-pollution legislation in the 1960s and 1970s
because federal legislation was preferable to state legislation); Revesz, supra note 127, at 573
(noting that, in the mid-1960s, the automobile industry began to advocate for federal autoemission standards provided that such standards would preempt more stringent state
standards).
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Article explores the growth of federal statutes and the rise of the
regulatory state to show how statutory law has been used to displace state
common law even in the absence of express or implied preemption. A
review of the legal theory on the relationship between statutory law and
common law shows, however, that statutes can, and should, be used to
develop and inform state common law so that the common law may work
alongside statutes to create a body of law that addresses the legal issues of
the day. The varying paths of common law are illustrated in the
development of environmental law from its common law tort beginnings, to
its statutory and regulatory growth beginning in the 1970s, to recent efforts
to revive state common law to address modern-day environmental problems
that the federal regulatory state cannot or will not address. As this
development illustrates, state common law can be a powerful tool for
environmental protection if courts can expand its scope to include the
policies, data, and standards that related statutes and regulations now make
available. In this way, we can not only create a vibrant and progressive state
common law but add a new coherence to the field as a whole by integrating
all sources of environmental law and allowing them to work together to
shape environmental-protection efforts.

